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I. INTRODUCTION
[1] An explosion in the amount and discovery of electronically stored
information (ESI) threatens to clog the federal court system and make
judicial determination of the substantive merits of disputes an endangered
species.1 It is interesting that this information discovery explosion has
*

Doug Rogers is a 1971 graduate of Yale Law School and a partner in the Columbus
office of Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease, L.L.P. He is a member of the firm’s
Litigation Group, its ESI Core Team, and its Technology and Intellectual Property
Group. He is the author of a number of articles on electronic discovery, copyright,
trademark, and antitrust law. The views expressed in this article are his own.
1
Ross Chaffin, The Growth of Cost-Shifting in Response to the Rising Cost and
Importance of Computerized Data in Litigation, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 115, 154 (2006)
(“Often, a court’s decision regarding the allocation of costs in this very expensive
discovery will induce settlement, and thus determine the outcome of the litigation
itself.”); Mia Mazza, Emmalena K. Quesada & Ashley L. Sternberg, In pursuit of FRCP
1: Creative Approaches to Cutting and Shifting Costs of Discovery of Electronically
Stored Information, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, ¶ 3 (2007) (stating “the explosive growth
of ESI has changed the very nature of discovery, with new electronic complexities
making the preservation and production of evidence far more challenging.”); George L.
Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System Adapt?, 13 RICH.
J.L. TECH. 10, ¶ 2 (2007) (stating “it is no exaggeration to say that litigation, as we have
known it, is threatened by information’s new hyper-flow.”); Martin H. Redish, Electronic
Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 605 (2001) (stating “it is clear
that the existing discovery structure threatens core values of the litigation matrix.”); Lee
H. Rosenthal, A Few Thoughts on Electronic Discovery After December 1, 2006, 116
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skipped over Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides in part that the federal rules “shall be construed and administered
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action.”2
[2] Clients know, or after first becoming involved in litigation learn, that
federal court litigation is rarely speedy or inexpensive. However, the
amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically addressing this
explosion in the discovery of ESI (the “ESI Rules”) became effective on
December 1, 2006.3 Do the ESI Rules help?
[3] This article addresses that question by reviewing many of the federal
court decisions on the ESI Rules4 and proposing general principles to help
make the discovery aspect of litigation more manageable, without harming
the due process rights of the litigants.5 Specifically, this article analyzes
issues chronologically from the view of an attorney or client facing
litigation:

YALE L.J. POCKET PART 167, 191 (Nov. 30, 2006) (Lawyers and judges are collectively
wringing their hands over the continuing decline in the number of trials, especially jury
trials. The factors that contribute to this are many and varied, but there is a consensus
that the costs and delays of civil litigation - largely due to discovery - play a significant
role.)
2
FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (2007). See also Mazza, supra note 1, at 176 ([L]itigants should be
aggressive in invoking FRCP 1 as a basis for the innovative use of search strategies and
cost-shifting to increase efficiency and reduce costs across the board in discovery. It is
only in this way that the mandate of a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action will become a reality in discovery.).
3
Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 167 (stating “[o]n December 1 [2006], amendments will go
into effect to make the discovery rules better able to accommodate the vast changes in
information technology that have already occurred and that will inevitably continue.”).
4
There have been a number of decisions since December 1, 2006 addressing the issue of
whether the inadvertent production of ESI constituted a waiver of the attorney-client
privilege or the attorney work product doctrine. See, e.g. In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig.,
501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 791 (E.D. La. 2007); Pinnacle Pizza Co. v. Little Caesar Enters.,
No. CIV. 04-4170, 2007 WL 1960585, at *1 (D.S.D. July 3, 2007); Corvello v. New
England Gas Co., 243 F.R.D. 28, 28 (D.R.I. 2007); Amersham Biosciences Corp. v.
PerkinElmer, Inc., No. 03-4901 (JLL), 2007 WL 329290, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2007).
These issues are beyond the scope of this article.
5
Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 465 (2000) (stating that “[t]he Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure are designed to further the due process of law that the Constitution
guarantees.”).
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Part II addresses steps a company facing litigation may
have to address to satisfy the legal requirement of
preserving relevant ESI;
Part III shows that Rule 26(b)(2)(C) allows a court to
restrict production of ESI when the marginal utility of that
ESI seems small, even though that ESI contains relevant
and accessible information;
Part IV addresses the difficult issue of the production of
information that is periodically changing, such as metadata,
databases and information on RAM; and
Part V argues that “good cause” under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) for
the production of not reasonably accessible ESI generally
should require a showing that there have been discrepancies
in the production or preservation of accessible
documents/ESI.6
[4] This article concludes that clients and their attorneys take risks in
making unilateral decisions on many of these issues, rather than disclosing
their decisions early to the court and opposing counsel.

6

The term used in Rule 26(b)(2)(B) is “electronically stored information from sources
that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). This article sometimes uses the phrase “inaccessible format”
as a shorthand for the longer phrase used in Rule 26(b)(2)(B).

3
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II. TO SUSPEND OR NOT TO SUSPEND COMPUTER DOCUMENT
DESTRUCTION PRACTICES
A. INTRODUCTION
[5] The general duty to preserve documents and ESI7 arises not from any
specific federal rule, but from federal case law.8 The contours of the duty
to preserve are extremely difficult to determine.9 The general statement
about the duty to preserve is that when litigation is reasonably likely, a
company has an obligation to preserve documents and ESI relevant to both
the anticipated claims and defenses, but there are at least three separate
elements to the duty to preserve.10 One is when the duty to preserve
7

The Advisory Committee Notes (“Committee Notes”) to the ESI Rules state that
although “documents” generally include ESI, ESI is in many ways distinct from other
documents:
[I]t has become increasingly difficult to say that all forms of
electronically stored information, many dynamic in nature, fit within
the traditional concept of a ‘document.’
. . . At the same time, a Rule 34 request for production of ‘documents’
should be understood to encompass, and the response should include,
electronically stored information unless discovery in the action has
clearly distinguished between electronically stored information and
“documents.”
234 F.R.D. 219 (2006). Advisory Committee Notes are instructive in determining the
intent of Congress in the rules, but they do not have the force of law. McKnight v.
Purdue Pharma Co., 422 F. Supp. 2d 756, 758 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
8
Thomas Y. Allman, Managing Preservation Obligations After the 2006 Federal EDiscovery Amendments, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, ¶ 1 (2007). Of course, various statutes
require certain companies to preserve certain documents and ESI. In addition, to the
extent a party violates a court order for the production of evidence, the court has authority
both under Rule 37(b) and its inherent power to sanction the non-producing party. See
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216-17 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that
“[t]he authority to sanction litigants for spoliation arises jointly under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the court’s own inherent powers. . . . The duty to preserve
attached at the time that litigation was reasonably anticipated.”).
9
Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The December 2006
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 13 (2006)
(stating “[p]erhaps the most vexing issues in electronic discovery, and the issues that grab
the most headlines, are the issue of data preservation and its flip side, spoliation.”).
10
See Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 216-18; see also The Sedona Conference Commentary on
Legal Holds, The Trigger & the Process (Aug. 2007 Public Cmt. Version), available at
www.thesedonaconference.org.
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commences.11 A second is to determine how far beyond the physical
boundaries of the company, if at all, the duty to preserve documents within

11

See, e.g., Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding
that no sanction for spoliation occurred); Kronisch v. U.S., 150 F.3d 112, 126-27 (2d Cir.
1998) (holding that reason for destruction – such as fear of litigation – can show there
was obligation to preserve); Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. Coll., No. 3:04-CV-1976 (JCH), 2007
WL 2066497, at *3 (D. Conn. July 16, 2007) (stating that the defendant had a duty to
preserve based on a meeting among certain employees regarding the incident that showed
defendant “was aware of Doe’s allegations of sexual assault by MASI,” even before
counsel sent a demand letter); Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No.
C 03-5340 JF (RS), 2007 WL 1848665, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2007) (stating that duty
to preserve documents arose at time of cease and desist letter); Cache La Poudre Feeds,
Inc. v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 623 (D. Col. 2007) (holding that pre-suit
demand letter from counsel for company B concerning possible trademark infringement
by company A did not trigger obligation to preserve, because letter (1) did not threaten
litigation, and (2) discussed resolving the matter); PML N. Am., LLC v. Hartford
Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 05-CV-70404-DT, 2006 WL 3759914, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Dec.
20, 2006) (holding that statement of adverse party that it rejected change to insurance
agreement, that threatened legal action for fraud, gave rise to duty to preserve); In re
Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (stating that
litigation against company does not, by itself, create obligation to preserve documents
regarding possible litigation against shareholder of company); In re Quintus Corp., 353
B.R. 77, 84 (D. Del. 2006) (holding that the party should have anticipated litigation over
its failure to comply with asset purchase agreement, since it destroyed books and records
at a time it had not paid all the liabilities it had assumed); Kemper Mortgage, Inc. v.
Russell, No. 3:06-cv-042, 2006 WL 2319858, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 18, 2006) (adopting
Zubulake that duty to preserve “was triggered when defendant learned that plaintiff was
likely to sue, well before she filed a discrimination charge” with the EEOC); Broccoli v.
Echostar Commc’n Corp., 229 F.R.D. 506, 510-511 (D. Md. 2005) (linking duty to
preserve to “notice of potential litigation” and verbal complaints to supervisors);
Rutgerswerke AG v. Abex Corp., No. 93 CIV .2914 JFK, 2002 WL 1203836, at *13
(S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2002) (discussing steps by the prospective plaintiff to collect certain
evidence on the advice of its own counsel, triggering the duty to preserve more
documents); Sanchez v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 0494 LMM, 1999 WL
639703, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1999) (stating that steps the prospective plaintiff took
in preparation of litigation upon the advice of counsel, triggered obligation to preserve, or
at least to notify the third party who held the allegedly defective product); Lamarca v.
United States, 31 F. Supp. 2d 110, 127 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that death of a patient
created duty to preserve records pertaining to the patient, even before the patient’s estate
complained about death); AAB Joint Venture v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 432, 441-42
(2007) (stating that duty to preserve arose, before suit filed, when the plaintiff wrote letter
asking for equitable adjustment to contract price, not on earlier letter from the plaintiff
alleging differing note conditions at work location).

5
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its possession, custody or control extends.12 Once there is a duty to
preserve and the locations of the documents/ESI to consider for
preservation are identified, the third is to determine what to preserve.13
12

Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal
of the lawsuit in a products liability action because the defendant failed to preserve the
automobile he was driving, even though it was owned by someone else).
If a party cannot fulfill this duty to preserve because he does not own or
control the evidence, he still has an obligation to give the opposing
party notice of access to the evidence or of the possible destruction of
the evidence if the party anticipates litigation involving that evidence.
Id. See World Courier v. Barone, No. C 06-3072 TEH, 2007 WL 1119196, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 16, 2007) (holding unspecified adverse inference for destruction of hard drive
by the husband of the defendant in case alleging the defendant misappropriated trade
secrets of the plaintiff); In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 179, 195-96 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (stating that company had duty to preserve documents at overseas company that
resulted from reorganization of original company into two companies); A. Farber &
Partners, Inc. v. Garber, 234 F.R.D. 186, 189 (C.D. Cal.. 2006) (affirming that documents
are within a party’s possession, custody, or control for purposes of Rule 34 production if
it has the legal right to obtain the documents on demand).
13
See, e.g., School-Links Techs., Inc. v. Applied Res., Inc., No. 05-2088-JWL, 2007 WL
708213, at *3 (D. Kan. Feb. 28, 2007) (stating that there is a duty to preserve and provide
an opportunity for inspection to a potentially responsible party before destruction);
Phillips v. Netblue, Inc., No. C-05-4401 SC, 2007 WL 174459, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
22, 2007) (holding that the plaintiff did not have obligation to preserve images obtained
by clicking on links embedded in e-mails he was required to preserve); In Re Napster,
Inc. Copyright Litig., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (stating that “Hummer had a continuing
duty to preserve documents after the Katz lawsuit was dismissed in July 2001.”); Del
Campo v. Kennedy, No. C-01-21151 JW (PVT), 2006 WL 2586633, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 8, 2006) (ordering Defendant to maintain voice mails beyond scheduled retention
period); Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Alcoa, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 335, 345 (M.D. La. 2006)
(stating that “Alcoa was not required to preserve every shred of paper but only those
documents of which it had ‘actual knowledge’ that they would be material to future
claims.”); Kemper Mortgage, 2006 WL 2319858, at *2 (holding that one must preserve
what it knows or reasonably should have known is reasonably likely to be requested
during discovery and must not destroy unique evidence helpful to adversary); Concord
Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 33352759, at *7 (E.D. Ark.
Aug. 29, 1997) (rejecting argument that because the defendant was involved in antitrust
matters from 1992 to 1997, it was under a duty to preserve all e-mails relevant to antitrust
issues from that date on, and concluded it “would simply be inappropriate to give an
adverse inference instruction based upon speculation that deleted emails would be
unfavorable to Defendants’ case.”); see also THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES
RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT
PRODUCTION 32 Cmt. 5.d. (2d ed. June 2007) (stating that “[i]t must be recognized that in
some circumstances, a legal hold notice may be unnecessary (e.g., the relevant
information is already secured). . . .”) [hereinafter Sedona Principles].
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[6] One reason the duty to preserve ESI is important is that if a party
violates its duty to preserve, the court can impose significant sanctions.14
These can include monetary sanctions, a prohibition against that party
questioning witnesses on certain issues, an instruction to the jury that it
can find the party destroyed the ESI because the ESI was harmful to that
party on specified issues (an adverse inference instruction), a finding by
the court that certain issues are deemed to have been established against

14

The federal courts have decided many cases since December 1, 2006 on the sources of
authority to sanction parties and counsel for destruction of ESI and other discovery
abuses. See, e.g., Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wade, 2007 WL 1189451 (8th Cir. 2007);
Google, Inc., 2007 WL 1848665, at *1; In re Sept. 11th Liab. Ins. Coverage Cases, 243
FRD 114 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Miller v. Holzmann, No. 951231 (RCL), 2007 WL 781841
(D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2007); Floeter v. City of Orlando, No. 6:05-cv-400-Orl-22KRS, 2007
WL 486633 (M.D. Fla. 2007); Padgett v. City of Monte Sereno, 2007 WL 878575 (N.D.
Cal. 2007); Wachtel v. Health Net, Inc., 2006 WL 3538935 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2006); United
Med. Supply Co. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 257 (2007); Tri-State Armored Servs., Inc.
v. Subranni, 366 B.R. 326 (D.N.J. 2007). Although the standard can vary among
jurisdictions:
Generally, a party claiming spoliation of evidence must show the
following elements: (1) that the party had an obligation to preserve the
electronic evidence at the time it was destroyed; (2) that the electronic
evidence was destroyed with a culpable state of mind (may include
ordinary negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, willful, or
intentional); and (3) the destroyed evidence was relevant and favorable
to the party's claim such that a reasonable trier of fact could find it
would support that claim.
In re Krause, 367 B.R. 740, 766-67 (D. Kan. 2007). Some courts say that if there is
evidence that the party facing sanctions destroyed the ESI willfully or in bad faith, that is
sufficient to satisfy the third point. Id. at 767; see also Phoenix Four, Inc. v. Strategic
Res. Corp., No. 05 Civ. 4837, 2006 WL 1409413 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). But see, e.g.,
Condrey v. SunTrust Bank of Ga., 431 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 2005); Morris v. Union Pacific
R.R., 373 F.3d 896 (8th Cir. 2004); Stevenson v. Union Pacific R.R., 354 F.3d 739 (8th
Cir. 2004); Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir.
2002); Bashir v. Amtrak, 119 F.3d 929 (11th Cir. 1997); Optowave v. Nikitin, No. 6:05cv-1083-Orl-22DAB, 2006 WL 3231422 (M.D.Fla. 2006); Mosaid Techs., Inc. v.
Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D. N.J. 2004). This article analyzes steps
to consider to avoid sanctions, not the authority of courts to impose, and the standards
for, sanctions. But see In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (N.D.
Cal. 2006); Consol. Aluminum Corp., 244 F.R.D. at 335; Concord Boat Corp., 1997 WL
33352759, at *1. There is disagreement over what constitutes a culpable state of mind,
and courts sometimes apply different standards, depending on the sanctions in question

7
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the sanctioned party, and even a judgment on liability against the
sanctioned party.15
[7] This article considers any guidelines that exist to help companies
determine - once the duty to preserve has arisen - which policies/practices
that result in the “automatic”16 deletion or change by computer of ESI they
must suspend.17 In other words, what ESI must a company preserve? For
instance, a document retention policy of a company may provide for the
destruction of all e-mails within 90 days after being received. Although
perhaps not thought of as document destruction policies, another example
of an automatic deletion/change practice is the change in a company’s
database of orders, shipments, and receipts, in which the dollar amount of
total orders will change automatically each time the company records a
new order.18

15

See, e.g., Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL
66932 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (finding attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of
$8,568,633.24); J. P. Morgan Chase Bank v. Neovi, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-0095, 2007 WL
1989752 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (precluding the defendant from contesting one dispositive
legal issue); Doe, 2007 WL 2066497, at *8 (holding adverse inference); World Courier,
2007 WL 1119196, at *3 (holding adverse inference); Teague v. Target Corp., No.
3:06CV191, 2007 WL 1041191, at *2 (W.D. N.C. 2007) (holding adverse inference);
Claredi Corp. v. Seebeyond Techs. Corp., No. 4:04CV1304 RWS, 2007 WL 735018, at
*4 (E.D. Mo. 2007) (monetary); May v. Pilot Travel Ctrs., LLC, No. 2:05-cv-918, 2006
WL 3827511 (S.D Ohio Dec. 28, 2006) (holding unspecified, except attorneys’ fees);
PML N. Am., LLC, 2006 WL 3759914, at *9 (entering a default judgment); Wachtel, 239
F.R.D. at 115 (deeming certain facts admitted); Krumwiede v. Brighton Assocs., LLC,
No. 05 C 3003, 2006 WL 1308629 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2006) (entering a default judgment
on certain counterclaims); United Med. Supply Co., 77 Fed. Cl. at 276 (2007) (prohibiting
the sanctioned party from questioning witness).
16
It is automatic based on the instructions previously provided to the computer.
17
The same question arises for document policies of a company imposing certain volume
limits on an employee’s e-mail, such as after 1 gigabyte, the employee cannot save any
additional e-mail. See Allman, supra note 8, at 58.
18
“Dynamic databases, for example, are . . . constantly changing as data are added or
modified. . . . More generally, computer systems routinely supersede and replace data,
and most also discard data according to some directions installed with them.” Richard L.
Marcus, E-Discovery & Beyond: Toward Brave New World or 1984?, 236 F.R.D. 598,
610, 615. See also Allman, supra note 8, at ¶ 7 (“[R]outine business processes are often
designed to free up storage space for other uses without any intent to impede the
preservation of potential evidence for use in discover. Interruption of those routine
processes is notoriously difficult to implement in a consistent fashion.”).
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[8] Must a company suspend these policies/practices when litigation is
likely? The next section looks at what the cases under the new ESI rules
have said on this issue.
B. PRESERVATION CASES UNDER THE NEW ESI RULES
[9] The ESI Rules now provide a “limited safe harbor”19 for preservation
decisions in Rule 37(e):20 “Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may
not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide
electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith
operation of an electronic information system.”21 Thomas Allman
correctly noted – even before many of the decisions discussed next – that
19

See Allman, supra note 8, at ¶ 33; see also Philip J. Favro, A New Frontier in
Electronic Discovery: Preserving and Obtaining Metadata, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1,
*20 (2007). Cf. Ex rel. Edmondson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 05-CV-329-GKF-SAJ,
2007 WL 149873, *6 (N.D. Okla. 2007) (“The Court further advises the parties that they
should be very cautious in relying upon any ‘safe harbor’ doctrine as described in new
Rule 37(f).”).
20
On December 1, 2007, what had been Rule 37(f) became Rule 37(e). See FED. R. CIV.
P. 37, see also Electronic Discovery and Evidence: Newly Revised Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Proceedings Effective December 1st, 2007, available at
http://arkfeld.blogs.com/ede/2007/12/newly-revised-f.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2008). In
discussing court decisions issued prior to December 1, 2007, this article refers to Rule
37(f). Otherwise, this article refers to Rule 37(e).
21
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). It is significant that Rule 37(e) does not relate only to formal
document retention programs but to all changes in information due to the “operation of an
electronic information system.” The Committee Notes explain:
Examples of this feature in present systems includes programs that
recycle storage media kept for brief periods against the possibility of a
disaster that broadly affects computer operations; automatic
overwriting of information that has been ‘deleted’; programs that
change metadata (automatically created identifying information about
the history or management of an electronic file) to reflect the latest
access to particular electronically stored information; and programs that
automatically discard information that has not been accessed within a
defined period or that exist beyond a defined period without an
affirmative effort to store it for a longer period. Similarly, many
database programs automatically create, discard, or update information
without specific direction from, or awareness of, users.
Advisory Committee notes, 234 F.R.D. at 370. Rule 37(e) does not purport to address a
court’s inherent authority to impose sanctions for destruction of documents. See Allman,
supra note 8, at ¶ ¶ 10, 35; Judge S. A. Scheindlin, Address, Moore’s Federal Practice E-Discovery: The Newly Amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (2006), at 27.

9
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the “cases are far from uniform on the need to routinely interrupt the
recycling of existing backup media.”22 However, keeping in mind that
Rule 37(e) “reflects the fact that in the world of electronic information it is
simply not fair to assume that a loss of ESI necessarily equates to intent to
destroy evidence,”23 certain principles arise from the following cases.
1. KEY EMPLOYEES
[10] In In re NTL, Inc. Securities Litigation, the court granted an adverse
inference instruction as the result of the destruction of the e-mails of fortyfour key employees24. Magistrate Judge Peck said, “[o]nce a party
reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document
retention/destruction policy and put in place a ‘litigation hold’ to ensure
the preservation of relevant documents.”25 However, the magistrate judge
also indicated in his decision that the obligation to preserve documents
applied only to key employees of the defendant, such as “directors,
officers, managers and the employees in charge of financial decision
making.”26
[11] Determining the key players was also an important issue in deciding
the parameters of the scope of the duty to suspend document destruction
policies in Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc.27 The
22

Allman, supra note 8, at ¶ 42.
Id. at ¶ 34. In addition, “[i]nterruption of those routine processes is notoriously
difficult to implement in a consistent fashion.” Id. at ¶ 7. See also id. at ¶ 35.
24
In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 179 (2007).
25
Id. at 193 (quoting Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y.
2003)). In Zubulake, the court also said that “the duty to preserve extends to those
employees likely to have relevant information - the ‘key players’ in the case.” Zubulake,
220 F.R.D. at 218.
26
In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. at 194. The court applied this obligation to
affiliates in other countries and said that where more severe sanctions were issue, the
moving party must show that the lost information would be favorable to it. Id. at 199
(quoting Chan v. Triple 8 Palace, Inc., 2005 WL 1925579, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11,
2005)). However, it also stated that when a party destroyed evidence in bad faith, that
faith alone was circumstantial evidence from which a fact finder could conclude the
evidence was unfavorable to the destroying party. Id. at 199 (quoting Residential
Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2002)).
27
Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614 (D. Colo. Mar. 2,
2007). The court in Cache took a limited view of when the obligation to preserve was
triggered. It said that “while a party should not be permitted to destroy potential evidence
23
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court said that counsel for the defendants in this trademark infringement
action was required to undertake a reasonable investigation of “employees
who played a significant or decision-making role.”28 The court concluded
that the fact Land O’Lakes – after the duty to preserve had arisen –
continued its document retention practice of expunging the hard drives of
former key employees in the development and implementation of the
brand violated the defendant’s obligation to preserve ESI in the case.29
[12] Magistrate Judge Facciola discussed the obligation to turn off
automatic delete features in Peskoff v. Faber.30 He at first appeared to
state an absolute, inflexible legal rule when he said that “[t]he Advisory
Committee comments to amended Rule 37(f) make it clear that any
automatic deletion feature should be turned off and a litigation hold
imposed once litigation can be reasonably anticipated.”31 However, he
then used more flexible language when he concluded:
Faber’s not turning the automatic deletion feature off once
informed of pending litigation may serve as a premise for
additional judicial action, including a sanction, without
offending amended Rule 37(f). It is a legitimate exercise of
discretion to require Faber to participate in a process to
ascertain whether a forensic examination can yield e-mails
that were deleted after February 6, 2004, because at that
after receiving unequivocal notice of impending litigation, the duty to preserve relevant
documents should require more than a mere possibility of litigation.” Id. at 621. Since
the letter from counsel “implied that a client preferred and was willing to explore and
negotiate a resolution,” the court concluded that this letter did not create an obligation to
preserve. Id. at 622.
28
Id. at 629 (emphasis added). The court said it was not inclined to penalize a party for
failing to approach former employees in an effort to respond to “catch all” or “nearly
indecipherable requests for production. Id. at 627.
29
Id. at 629. The court also said that “once a litigation hold has been established, a party
cannot continue a routine procedure that effectively ensures that potentially relevant and
readily available information is no longer ‘reasonably accessible’ under Rule
26(b)(2)(B).” Id. It also added that Land O’Lakes’ general counsel and its retained
counsel had “failed in many respects to discharge their obligation to coordinate and
oversee discovery.” Id. at 630. The court, however, only imposed a monetary sanction of
$5,000.
30
Peskoff v. Faber, 244 F.R.D. 54 (D.D.C. 2007).
31
Id. at 60.
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time, Faber could reasonably anticipate that Peskoff would
sue him.32
It seems likely the court meant that once litigation became reasonably
likely, a failure to suspend automatic deletion features of a document
destruction program would put the burden on that party if a challenge to
the destruction arose in the litigation.
[13] After all, in the report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge
Facciola in Miller v. Holzmann,33 with which District Judge Lambreth
agreed,34 the magistrate judge said the hold memo needed to be sent to
“only those reasonably likely to maintain documents relevant to the
litigation or investigation.”35 This statement implicitly recognizes that
some relevant documents held by non-key employees may be deleted
without adverse consequences to the company, or otherwise the litigation
hold notice would have to be sent to more employees.
2. LIKELY SOURCES OF RELEVANT ESI
[14] Key employees should know what documents/ESI they create or
modify, but they may not know where the company stores the relevant
ESI. This imposes responsibility on not just the key employees, but IT
personnel in a company. Moreover, key employees probably have created
a lot of ESI of no relevance to a dispute. The cases have not adopted a
uniform standard on how certain a company must be that some source
contains relevant ESI in order to have to preserve that source.
[15] In Escobar v. City of Houston, the court indicated that under Rule
37(f), a company can continue to operate a document destruction program
32

Id. (emphasis added). As a result, the court ordered counsel for the parties to
collaborate on a request for proposals to conduct a forensic examination of the hard
drives of the applicable computers. Id. at 66.
33
Miller v. Holzmann, No. 95-01231 (RCL/JMF), 2007 WL 172327 (D.D.C. Jan. 17,
2007). Miller was a government contracting case, in which a copy of the response to a
FOIA request involving allegations of fraud in previous years had been made. That copy
was later destroyed as part of the authorized record destruction schedule of the National
Archives Administration Act. Id. at *4-5.
34
Id. at *1.
35
Id. at *6 (emphasis added).
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after a duty to preserve arises, unless the company knows, or reasonably
should know, that responsive documents would be destroyed by such
program. 36 Specifically, the court ruled that the “threshold issue is
whether and when the City knew or should have know[sic] that electronic
communications exchanged the day after a police shooting in November of
2003 were likely to contain information about that shooting.”37 The court
concluded:
The record shows that the officers involved in the shooting
were not likely to have used e-mail to communicate about
the event in the day after it occurred. The plaintiffs do not
point to specific evidence in the record demonstrating that
the City knew that information relevant to the shooting was
being destroyed because of the feature of the computer
system’s routine operation that e-mails were destroyed after
ninety days.38
The court added the City had demonstrated that “when it anticipated that
information or records would likely be relevant to the shooting, such
information and records were preserved.”39 The court therefore denied
sanctions.
36

Escobar v. City of Houston, No. 04-1945, 2007 WL 2900581, at *18 (S.D. Tex. Sept.
29, 2007).
37
Id. at *18 (emphasis added). The plaintiffs stated that they had provided notice to the
City of their claim within 60 days after the shooting and that the Houston Police
Department’s electronic communications in the 24 hours after the shooting were likely to
discuss events that occurred after the shooting of the individual involved. The City, in
turn, argued that it had preserved material it believed were relevant, including the
homicide file containing relevant video and audio files, the internal affairs investigation
filed and the record of the 911 calls. Id. at *17.
38
Id. at *19.
39
Id. Referring to the records of the 911 calls and the internal investigation into the
shooting., the court held that since the plaintiffs had not made a showing that the City’s
destruction of electronic communications was done in bad faith, and since there was no
evidence the information destroyed was relevant, it could not impose the sanctions the
plaintiff sought—an adverse inference. Id. at *18. The court did not discuss the
possibility of imposing milder sanctions. However, since the court appeared to conclude
the City had operated in good faith, presumably the court could not have imposed milder
sanctions under Rule 37(f). Milder sanctions under the court’s inherent power would
have been a possibility, but such a ruling would leave Rule 37(e) as a “safe harbor” in
which ships might not want to dock.
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[16] Similarly, in Benton v. Dlorah, Inc., the court concluded that the duty
to preserve required the party to preserve what she knows or reasonably
should know is relevant in the action. 40 The court added that although “the
scope of the duty to preserve evidence is not boundless, at a minimum an
opportunity for inspection should be afforded a potentially responsible
party before relevant evidence is destroyed.”41
[17] On the other hand, the district court in In re K-Mart Corp.42 indicated
the requesting party must prove actual knowledge of the likely destruction
of relevant ESI in order for the court to impose sanctions for spoliation of
evidence.43 Under the company’s document retention policy, e-mails in
inboxes were deleted 90 days after the date sent, e-mails in sent folders
were deleted 30 days after the date sent, e-mails in the deleted items folder
were deleted when the user shut down her computer, and e-mails in user
defined folders were deleted 180 days after the date sent.44 The court
found that K-Mart did not put a litigation hold in place, and said that
“while the failure to implement a litigation hold does not necessarily give
rise to sanctions for spoliation of evidence, it is at least ‘relevant’ to the
spoliation inquiry.”45 The court concluded, however, that “Global has
failed to establish that K-Mart knew there was relevant, discoverable
information among the documents being destroyed pursuant to the
company’s pre-existing document retention/destruction policy. Indeed, as
discussed further below, it is not entirely clear that such information was,
in fact, destroyed.”46 The court declined to sanction K-Mart for spoliation
at that time.47
40

Benton v. Dlorah, Inc., No. 06-CV-2488-KHV, 2007 WL 3231431, at *4 (D. Kan.
Oct. 30, 2007) (“A litigant has a duty to preserve evidence that it knows or should know
is relevant to imminent or ongoing litigation”) (citing Workman v. AB Electrolux Corp.,
2005 WL 1896246, at *5 (D. Kan. Aug. 8, 2005)).
41
Id. at *4 (citing Workman v. AB Electrolux Corp., 2005 WL 1896246, *6 (D. Kan.
Aug. 8, 2005) (emphasis added)). The court also mentioned that “preservation may not
be ‘selective,’ saving only the evidence supporting the theory of liability and impeding
the examination of another theory.”
42
In re K-Mart Corp., 371 B.R. 823 (Bankr. N.D. Ill., 2007).
43
Id. at 849.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 847.
46
Id. at 848-49 (emphasis added).
47
Id. at 855. The court did award Global’s attorneys fees and costs. The court did not
expressly discuss Rule 37(f) in the opinion. The court did order the defendant, “to the
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3. AVAILABILITY FROM OTHER SOURCES
[18] Whether there are alternate sources available for the same ESI can be
an important consideration for some courts in determining the scope of the
duty to preserve. In Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wade,48 an Archway truck
rear-ended a Greyhound bus, and litigation ensued.49 Ten days after the
accident, Greyhound removed the electronic control module that stored
certain information concerning speed, starts, stops, and the times and types
of mechanical failures that could befall a bus.50 The electronic control
module (ECM) indicated that failure in a speed-sensor had caused the
slow speed of the bus.51 Greyhound had sent the electronic control
module to the engine manufacturer, who erased the information before the
case was filed.52 Archway moved for sanctions against Greyhound for
spoliation, but the district court denied the motion and the court of appeals
affirmed.53 The Eighth Circuit said that “although some material was not
preserved, the ECM data identified the specific mechanical defect that
slowed the bus, and several bus passengers testified about how the bus
acted before the collision.”54 In other words, lack of prejudice – because
the necessary information was otherwise available – was important to the
Eighth Circuit.55

extent it has not already done so, [to] perform a systematic search of all documents on its
P-drive and W-drive and produce them to counsel for Global. . . .” Id. The e-mails could
not be stored on either the P-drive or W-drive, and it appeared this part of the decision
was a response to testimony at the hearing by a witness (not listed on the pretrial
statement) about the P-drive and W-drive. Id. at 833.
48
Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wade, 485 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 2007).
49
Id.
50
Id. at 1034.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 1035.
54
Id..
55
In Wingnut Films, Ltd. v. Katja Motion Pictures Corp., the court sanctioned
defendant’s document destruction policy “or otherwise take adequate steps to preserve
documents.” Wingnut Films, Ltd. v. Katja Motion Pictures Corp., No. CV05-15160RSWL SHX, 2007 WL 2758571, *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2007). This language suggests
that if the documents had been available from another source, the court would not have
sanctioned the defendant for its failure to suspend an automatic deletion policy for certain
ESI.
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[19] The court seemed to take a different view in Miller.56 The
government argued that “most, if not all, of the documents that the
magistrate found to be lost and irretrievable were likely given to the
defendants over the course of discovery.”57 The court said that even if that
were true, the government’s conduct created a situation where the court
could not assess whether information had been lost and how important that
information was.58 The court concluded that even without proof of
prejudice, the government’s failure to act to preserve the documents
constituted sanctionable negligence.59
4. WHAT IS ROUTINE OPERATION?
[20] Courts have appeared skeptical of claims of routine operation
defenses under Rule 37(e). For instance, in Doe v. Norwalk Community
College, the court granted an adverse inference instruction based on the
defendant’s spoliation of evidence in a case in which the plaintiff alleged
violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.60 The
defendants argued that it was a normal practice at Norwalk Community
College to scrub the hard drives of employees who had left college
employment.61 The court said that Rule 37(f) “appears to require a routine
system in order to take advantage of the good faith exception, and the
court cannot find that the defendants had such a system in place.”62
[21] The court in Doe also said that “in order to take advantage of the
good faith exception, a party needs to act affirmatively to prevent the
system from destroying or altering information, even if such destruction
56

Ex rel. Miller v. Holzmann, No. 95-1231 (RCL), 2007 WL 781941 (D.D.C. Mar. 12,
2007).
57
Id. at *1.
58
Id. How can one party prove relevant e-mails were destroyed by a document retention
program? One typical way is for the requesting party to produce from some other source
an e-mail that should have been produced by the producing party. It might then be
logical to infer that other relevant e-mails had been deleted and the requesting party
harmed as a result.
59
Id. The court agreed with the magistrate judge’s earlier decision in the case to wait
until after trial to fashion an appropriate sanction.
60
Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. Coll., No. 3:04-CV-1976 (JCH), 2007 WL 2066497 (D. Conn.
July16, 2007).
61
Id. at *4.
62
Id.
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would occur in the regular course of business.”63 This sentence suggests
that if a party allows its routine document retention policy to destroy any
relevant documents, the party cannot take advantage of the good faith
exception in 37(f). However, if only irrelevant documents were destroyed
under a document destruction policy, there should be no sanctions, even
without 37(f). If 37(f) provides a party any protection, it consequently
means a routine document destruction policy may destroy some relevant
documents without sanction.
[22] The court in Doe relied on the Advisory Committee Notes to the ESI
Rules: “When a party is under a duty to preserve information because of
pending or reasonably anticipated litigation, intervention in the routine
operation of an information system is one aspect of what is often called a
‘litigation hold.’”64 However, an earlier sentence in the Committee Notes
states, “[g]ood faith in the routine operation of an information system may
involve a party’s intervention to modify or suspend certain features of that
routine operation to prevent the loss of information, if that information is
subject to a preservation obligation.”65 The Committee Notes do not
contemplate that a document retention policy must necessarily be
suspended, or the Committee would not have used “may.”66
[23] The defendants in Doe argued that they had no choice but to continue
the routine deletion of the backup server, because otherwise, they would
have had to reveal the identity of the “Jane Doe plaintiff” in sending out
63

Id.
Id. at *4 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f), Advisory Comm.’s Notes to 2006) (emphasis
added).
65
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f), Advisory Comm.’s Notes to 2006.
66
Of course, if a company has retention polices (some companies apparently have no
such policies) involving periodic deletion of ESI, or volume limits on ESI, presumably
the application of some retention polices or volume limits will have to be suspended,
unless perhaps the dispute involves events occurring before the company had ESI. The
Committee Notes say, “[i]t is unrealistic to expect parties to stop such routine operation
of their computer systems as soon as they anticipate litigation. It is also undesirable; the
result would be even greater accumulation of duplicative and irrelevant data that must be
reviewed, making discovery more expensive and time-consuming.” 234 F.R.D. 219.
However, the Committee Notes also admit, “[t]here is considerable uncertainty as to
whether a party – particularly a party that produces large amounts of information –
nonetheless has to interrupt the operation of the electronic information systems it is using
. . . .” Id.
64
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the litigation hold notice. The court rejected that argument, saying that
“the defendants could at least have conferred with Doe’s counsel
regarding this question of how to send a system-wide communication on
document retention without revealing Doe’s real name,” or it could have
instructed IT employees “to cease the deletion or scrubbing of electronic
data.”67 The court did not address whether it would have been
burdensome for the defendant to preserve the data.
[24] A court also rejected the “routine operation” defense in In re Krause,
which involved the debtor’s use of GhostSurf on his computers.68 The
court ordered Krause to turn over the hard drives of his computers to the
trustee, but Krause installed and ran GhostSurf on his computers
immediately prior to turning over the hard drives, resulting in the deletion
of files.69 Krause argued that the two hard drives on his computer had
crashed in 2006, that he had been using GhostSurf prior to 2006 “to
protect his computers from viruses and worms that he feared would infect
them because of his extensive use of the internet in his work,”70 and that
he re-installed and operated Ghost Surf after his computers had crashed.71

67

Doe, 2007 WL 2066497, at *4 n.9. (emphasis added).
In re Krause, 367 B.R. 740, 767 (D. Kan. 2007). The court said:
GhostSurf is designed to wipe or eradicate data and files as part of its
protective and security functions. GhostSurf wipes files that may be
infected with viruses and worms. It can also be set to purge or wipe
‘deleted files’ in such a way that the data is actually overwritten,
precluding the ability to recover or restore the files and data. Both
experts agreed that when a user “deletes” files from a hard drive, the
data remains intact. The act of deletion merely eliminates the “pointer”
that allows the computer to locate the data on the hard drive. By using
data recovery software, that data may be extracted (as, indeed, some
has been in this case). An additional step is necessary to eradicate this
data entirely. GhostSurf performs this function by overwriting the file
with a new file that contains no bytes of data . . . .”
Id. at 749-50. The court also said that GhostSurf included an application, Tracks Cleaner,
that “tracks and cleans files in all applications . . . . The user can select which ‘elements –
browsers, email programs, Office applications, etc. – to wipe.” Id. at 752. In other
words, it appears that GhostSurf can erase the remnants of deleted files and can also
eliminate active files.
69
Id. at 749.
70
Id.
71
Id.
68
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The court said there was “no credible evidence” to support that claim.72 In
other words, the operation of GhostSurf had not been routine, since
Krause had used GhostSurf promptly after installation and immediately
prior to turning his hard drives over to the trustee.73
[25] The court in Krause found that even after the duty to preserve had
arisen, Krause “generally deleted e-mails once they were no longer
relevant to his ongoing enterprises,”74 and he allowed the Tracks Cleaner
application in GhostSurf to wipe other relevant files.75 The court entered a
partial default judgment against Krause.76
[26] The court in Krause made a statement that might suggest a general
obligation to preserve inaccessible data, such as deleted files, in addition
to accessible data. For instance, it said, “[o]nce the duty to preserve
attached, Krause was required to suspend his routine document destruction
practices, be it the deletion of e-mails or the operation of wiping software
to prevent recovery of the electronic evidence,” citing Zubulake.77
However, the court in Zubulake expressly rejected normally requiring a
party to preserve inaccessible ESI as follows: “As a general rule, that
litigation hold does not apply to inaccessible backup tapes (e.g., those
typically maintained solely for the purpose of disaster recovery), which
may continue to be recycled on the schedule set forth in the company’s
policy.”78
[27] The court in Krause, in fact, expressly recognized that the debtor had
not necessarily been under an obligation to preserve “every e-mail or
electronic document he generated or existed on his hard drive.”79 Quoting
Zubulake, the court said Krause was “under a duty to preserve what [he]
72

Id.
“[A] litigant has an obligation to suspend features of a computer’s operation that are
not routine if those features will result in destroying evidence.” Id. at 768. The court
also said it was crucial that Krause had purged “his electronic data and files immediately
prior to turning over his computers and after learning that the Court was ordering their
production.” Id.
74
Id. at 753.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 777.
77
Id. at 766.
78
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
79
In re Krause, 367 B.R. at 766.
73
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knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant in the action, is reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, is reasonably
likely to be requested during discovery and/or is the subject of a pending
discovery request.”80
[28] A key in Krause is that after the duty to preserve had arisen, Krause
“continued his routine practice of deleting e-mails.”81 Upon such
deletions, the only evidence of those e-mails would be in the inaccessible
parts of the computer. As a result, Krause had the obligation not to erase
the inaccessible parts of his computer, because that was the only source in
which the trustee could recover the deleted e-mails. This is consistent
with other cases in 2007, discussed next, holding that deletion of
accessible ESI after the duty to preserve has attached provides good cause
to search ESI in inaccessible formats.
5. FAILURE TO PRESERVE ACCESSIBLE ESI
[29] The fact that the defendant’s auto-delete practices allowed
responsive information to be deleted from accessible storage provided
good cause to order the search of inaccessible storage media in Disability
Rights Counsel of Greater Washington v. Washington Metropolitan
Transit Authority.82 The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, which prohibits discrimination against individuals
with disabilities.83 Although the complaint had been filed on March 25,
2004, the defendant acknowledged that until at least June of 2006 it had
done nothing to stop its e-mail system from obliterating all e-mails after
60 days, as a result of the automatic delete feature of its computer
system.84 The court ordered the defendants to search backup tapes that

80

Id. at 766.
Id.
82
Disability Rights Council v. Wash. Metro. Transit Auth., 242 F.R.D. 139 (D.D.C.
2007). The plaintiff in Disability Rights Counsel was not seeking sanctions, but simply
asking that the defendant be required to search the backup tapes for discoverable
information deleted by the document retention policy. The court considered the
balancing factors listed in Rule 26(b)(2)(B) and 26(b)(2)(C) and concluded that “these
factors make for an overwhelming case for production of the backup tapes.” Id. at 148.
83
Id. at 141.
84
Id. at 145.
81
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they held.85 The court said that the good faith requirement of Rule 37(f)
meant that “a party is not permitted to exploit the routine operation of an
information system to thwart discovery obligations by allowing that
operation to continue in order to destroy specific stored information that it
is required to preserve.”86
[30] In Benton v. Dlorah, Inc., a different district court ordered the
plaintiff in an employment discrimination action to produce for inspection
her hard drive to determine if e-mails had been deleted.87
The
communications in questions were e-mails with the plaintiff’s husband
about what she thought was happening at the corporate defendant and emails with the defendant’s paralegals.88 The court said that “if the emails
have been deleted, she shall produce for inspection her computer hard
drive from which the deleted emails were sent. This will allow defendants
to use the services of a computer forensics specialist, if necessary, to
retrieve them.”89
[31] Benton is evidence that sometimes, individual sentences in many
decisions concerning the discovery of ESI should not be considered
separately. For instance, the court in Benton stated that “[o]nce the duty to
preserve documents attached, [the party] was required to suspend her
routine document destruction practices, including the deletion of emails.”90 That suggests an absolute duty to suspend document destruction
policies. However, the court also said, “Once a party reasonably
anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document
retention/destruction policy and put in place a litigation hold to ensure the
preservation of relevant documents.”91 In other words, the second
sentence suggests a party to litigation does not have to totally suspend
routine document destruction practices, but instead, must put in place
practices only to preserve relevant documents.
85

Id. at 146 (discussing the e-mails of three employees that had been retained, because
those three individuals archived all of their e-mails after 60 days).
86
Id.
87
Benton v. Dlorah, Inc., No. 06-CV-2488-KHV, 2007 WL 3231431, at *3 (D. Kan. Oct.
30, 2007).
88
Id.
89
Id. (explaining that the expert was limited to reviewing specific relevant e-mails).
90
Id. at *4.
91
Id. (emphasis added).
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6. DATABASES AND OTHER CHANGING DATA
[32] If databases or other data compilations are the source of relevant
information, a party cannot delete that database or data compilation once
the duty to preserve has attached.92 The more difficult issue is what does a
party do with a database that may change every day in the regular course
of its business? The Sedona Principles indicate that generally, courts
should not compel the preservation of “particularly transitory” ESI, but
recognize that in certain circumstances a court may order such
preservation.93
[33] This statement does not suggest that a company must take a snapshot
of the database at a particular point in time, but it does not preclude such
possibility. In Best Buy Stores, L.P. v. Developers Diversified Realty
Corp., the court rejected the argument of the defendant that the plaintiff
had to restore to a searchable format, a relevant database it had
downgraded to an unsearchable format. 94 The court observed that Best
Buy did not destroy the information but removed it from a searchable
format. However, “[a]bsent specific discovery requests or additional facts
suggesting that the database was of particular relevance to this litigation,
the court determines that Best Buy did not have an obligation to maintain
the Odom database at a monthly cost of over $27,000.”95 The court also
said that “Best Buy …. need not restore the information to searchable
format unless defendants establish good cause.”96 However, the court
noted that the defendants had not argued the requested materials were
uniquely available from the database and said, “[i]n the absence of
particularized arguments, the court cannot conclude that defendants have
established the good cause required to restore” the database.97

92

See Sedona Principles, supra note 13 (“Organizations must properly preserve
electronically stored information that can reasonably be anticipated to be relevant to
litigation.”).
93
Id. at 33.
96
Best Buy Stores, L.P. v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp. No. 05-2310 (DSD/JJG),
2007 WL 423086, at *2 (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 2007).
95
Id at *3.
96
Id.
97
Id. at *4.
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[34] Similar questions may arise with metadata that can change every
time a party revises a document. If in fact, a business is in the process of
revising a document, must it preserve a picture of each draft of the
document? In Wyeth v. Impax Laboratories, Inc., the court denied a
motion to compel the production of metadata, at least for the time being,
but added, “the producing party must preserve the integrity of the
electronic documents it produces.” 98 This does not state, however,
whether the party had to preserve metadata without change, or simply had
to preserve the metadata in whatever form it existed as the document
changed. The Sedona Principles suggest:
If such overwriting [presumably either in databases or
metadata] is incidental to the operation of the systems – as
opposed to a deliberate attempt to destroy evidence in
anticipation of or in connection with an investigation or
litigation – it should generally be permitted to continue . . .
unless the overwriting destroys potentially discoverable
electronic information that is not available from other
sources.99
7. ESI CREATED IN THE FUTURE
[35] When the litigation involves not just claims for which past ESI are
relevant, but claims for which ESI created after the commencement of the
litigation will be relevant, the courts have not provided much guidance.
98

Wyeth v. Impax Labs., Inc., No. 06-222-JJF, 2006 WL 3091331, at *2 (D. Del. 2006).
See further discussion infra Part IV.A.3.
99
See Sedona Principles, supra note 13, at 28. Comment 12a to Sedona Principles 12
provides:
The extent to which metadata should be preserved and produced in a
particular case will depend on the needs of the case. Parties and
counsel should consider: (a) what metadata is ordinarily maintained;
(b) the potential relevance of the metadata to the dispute . . . and (c) the
importance of reasonably accessible metadata to facilitating the parties’
review, production, and use of the information. In assessing
preservation, it should be noted that the failure to preserve and produce
metadata may deprive the producing party of the opportunity later to
contest the authenticity of the document if that metadata is material to
that determination.
Id., at 61

23

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIV, Issue 3

For instance, in Turner v. Resort Condominiums Int’l, the court denied a
motion for sanctions for the defendant’s failure to comply with a demand
“for an indefinite time not modify or delete any electronic data in any
mainframe, desktop, or laptop computers or other storage or media devices
. . . .” 100 Turner was a suit alleging pregnancy/sex discrimination.
Although decided in July 2006, the court discussed Rule 37(f), saying that
the “proposed Rule 37(f) recognizes that discovery should not prevent
continued routine operation of computer systems.”101 The court observed
that “the pre-suit letter did not accommodate the routine day-to-day needs
of a business with a complex computer network and demanded actions by
RCI that went well beyond its legal obligation on the 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14
and under its more general duty to avoid deliberate destruction of
evidence.”102 The court concluded that “[t]here is no evidence of any bad
faith alteration or destruction of evidence, and plaintiff has been given
ample opportunity to discover such evidence.”103
[36] In Wingnut Films, Ltd. v. Katja Motion Pictures Corp., the court
sanctioned the defendant for its failure to suspend the automatic deletion
of electronic documents, including documents created after the
commencement of the litigation. 104 The dispute was over the plaintiff’s
right to an accounting of royalties from the defendant’s sale and licensing
of various documents related to Lord of The Rings.105 Addressing not only
ESI created before the dispute arose, but also after the litigation had
commenced, the court said that the litigation concerned the accounting
“from the film’s release through to the present. New Line’s continued
purging of e-mails during the pendency of this litigation therefore cannot
be excused.”106 As in Turner, the court in Wingnut did not indicate how
100

Turner v. Resort Condos. Int’l, No. 1:03-CV-2025-DFH-WTL, 2006 WL 1990379, at
*6 (S.D. Ind. July 13, 2006).
101
Id. at *6 n.2 (emphasis added).
102
Id. at *6 (emphasis added).
103
Id. at *8. It is not clear whether there had been an automatic delete feature working on
the defendant’s computer systems, or simply the active use of computer systems and
databases by which the information contained in the systems/databases necessarily
changes.
104
Wingnut Films, Ltd. v. Katja Motion Pictures Corp., No. CV 05-1516-RSWL SHX,
2007 WL 2758571, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2007).
105
Id. at *2.
106
Id. (emphasis in original). The court had issued an order requiring the defendant to
produce all “damages-related documents for all accounting periods through the date of
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the defendant or a forensic expert should implement an ongoing document
preservation program for newly created ESI. But, since the subject of
damages was focused, it is logical that the preservation of such ESI would
be easier to accommodate than if a plaintiff is claiming an ongoing
conspiracy of some nature and wants the defendant to preserve all
documents relevant to those continuing claims and defenses.
C. PRINCIPLES
[37] It is clear that a party must not destroy documents it knows, or
should know, are likely to be relevant to reasonably expected litigation.107
However, the majority of cases show that automatic suspension of all
automatic deletion practices would be an over-reaction.108 Similarly, the
Sedona Principles state that “it is unreasonable to expect parties to take
every conceivable step to preserve all potentially relevant electronically
stored information.”109
[38] For instance, a party should not have to preserve all possible sources
of e-mail simply because it is possible that an existing or former
employee, who claims she was harassed, may have forwarded an e-mail
from her supervisor to other employees, or because one of the e-mails may

trial.” Id. at *2 n.1. The court concluded that the defendant “should be required to retain
an outside vendor experience in electronic document retrieval to collect responsive
documents” from servers and hard drives of specified employees. Id. at *17.
107
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
108
Focusing on individual sentences in court decisions could lead one to argue that a
party must preserve everything. For instance, in Zubulake, Judge Scheindlin said, “[a]
party or anticipated party must retain all relevant documents (but not multiple identical
copies) in existence at the time the duty to preserve attaches, and any relevant documents
created thereafter.” 220 F.R.D. at 218. However, in the same decision, Judge Scheindlin
recognized practical limits to this general statement: “Must a corporation, upon
recognizing the threat of litigation, preserve every shred of paper, every e-mail or
electronic document, and every backup tape? The answer is clearly, ‘no.’” Id. at 217.
See also Scheindlin, supra note 21, at 7-8 (rejecting the idea that “every scrap of ESI that
could possibly contain relevant information” must be saved and stating that “a balance
must be struck between meeting the obligations imposed by litigation and continuing to
function as a business. The answer is that it is impossible to save everything, but a good
faith effort must be made to save relevant evidence.”).
109
Sedona Principles, supra note 13, at 28.
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have been exported into a .pst file110 outside of the e-mail folders in the
cache111 of a computer.112 Comment 5a to Sedona Principle 5 explains:
The obligation to preserve relevant evidence is generally
understood to require that the producing party make
reasonable and good faith efforts to identify and manage
the information that it has identified as reasonably likely to
be relevant. Satisfying this obligation must be balanced
against the right of a party to continue to manage its
110

Pst (abbreviated from Personal Storage Table) files (files with *.pst extension) are
files used by Microsoft Outlook to store some certain data. Such files can be exported
from Microsoft Outlook and stored on an individual computer’s hard drive outside the
Outlook environment. See SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY: E-DISCOVERY & DIGITAL
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT (May 2005), available at
http://www.sedonaconference.org/ [hereinafter Sedona Glossary]; Microsoft Outlook
Backup, available at http://www.outlookbackup.com/pst-file.html (last visited Jan. 1,
2008).
111
Cache is “[a] dedicated, high speed storage location which can be used for the
temporary storage of frequently used data. As data may be retrieved more quickly from
cache than the original storage location, cache allows applications to run more quickly.
Web site contents often reside in cached storage locations on a hard drive.” See Sedona
Glossary, supra note 110, at 7.
112
Sedona Principles, supra note 13, at 38 (“Responding parties are best situated to
evaluate the procedures, methodologies, and technologies appropriate for preserving and
producing their own electronically stored information.”). Comment 6a explains,
“[t]ypically, the producing party identifies and informs the key individuals likely to have
relevant information of the specific need to preserve all available relevant information –
this instruction is sometimes referred to as a ‘litigation hold notice.’” Id. There is no
automatic need to go beyond the key individuals and the IT personnel who would know
where the company keeps the ESI of those key individuals. Of course, to the extent a
company has notice that relevant documents exist beyond those held by key individuals,
the obligation to preserve can expand. For instance, it presumably would not protect a
company that has issued and enforced a litigation hold to key employees, but otherwise
let document destruction continue, if the Comptroller of the company, who might not
normally be expected to be a key employee about personnel matters, knew she had a
damaging e-mail in his e-mail inbox and let the document retention policy destroy that email after 60 days. Alternatively, it could be argued that any employee whose knowledge
of events could be attributed to the company should be deemed a key employee. A
company should consider two separate “types” of knowledge: actual knowledge of the
location of relevant documents and constructive knowledge. A litigation hold should
cover sources where it is known relevant documents exist and those sources where it
reasonably can be anticipated that relevant documents exist that are not available
elsewhere.
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electronic information in the best interest of the enterprise,
even though some electronic information is necessarily
overwritten on a routine basis by various computer
systems.113
[39] On the other hand, to the extent the company knows certain relevant
ESI is contained only in a source for which the applicable document
retention policy will delete that ESI in the foreseeable future, the company
must suspend that policy retaining the ESI. Even if a company does not
know of specific relevant files contained in ESI, Escobar and Benton show
that if the company reasonably should know that relevant files are likely to
exist in ESI that do not exist elsewhere in the company in an accessible
format, the company should suspend the document retention policy for
that source and retain that ESI.114 This includes the preservation of
metadata for such files. To allow document retention policies to destroy
the ESI in either situation (actual or constructive knowledge that the emails are relevant and not otherwise available) probably would not
constitute the good faith operation of a document retention policy. It
would, in effect, be using a document retention policy with the intent to
remove relevant evidence.115
[40] Ignorance of the ESI is no excuse. As Judge Scheindlin said in
Zubulake, “[c]ounsel must become fully familiar with her client’s
document retention policies, as well as the client’s data retention
architecture.”116 Judge Rosenthal has said, “[e]lectronic discovery imposes
113

Id.; see also Steven C. Bennett, E-Discovery by Keyword Search, 15 No. 3 PRAC.
LITIGATOR 7 10-11 (Am. Law Ins. 2004).
A company need not preserve every scrap of paper in its files . . . . In
the electronic context, similarly, the standard for a search is
reasonableness. . . . When the relevant electronic documents are
confined in scope, they may be preserved in their entirety. When the
records are vast (such as a company’s entire e-mail system, a keyword
search may be employed.
Id. at 11.
114
See supra text accompanying notes 36-41.
115
“The good faith concept permits inquiry into whether a system was arranged to
remove embarrassing information, and also into whether the party took suitable
measures—sometimes called a ‘litigation hold’- to curtail discarding of information when
the prospect of litigation arose.” Marcus, supra note 18, at 615.
116
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 229 F.R.D. at 432.
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new requirements on lawyers and litigants to learn large amounts of
information about their own and their adversary’s information systems,
early in the case.”117 Parties and their counsel must make thoughtful
preservation decisions, no matter how difficult.
1. KEY EMPLOYEES
[41] An important step in document preservation is determining who the
key employees are, based on the reasonably anticipated claims and
defenses of the parties or anticipated parties. As the commentary to the
Sedona Principles states, “[t]ypically, the producing party identifies and
informs the key individuals likely to have relevant information of the
specific need to preserve all available relevant information . . . .”118 This
commentary is consistent with the cases decided in 2007 on ESI focusing
on key employees as the base for determining the scope of a document
hold.119 Those key employees are likely to include IT personnel, who
probably can best identify the servers and other media containing ESI
(perhaps once the business personnel describe the relevant ESI they
created for the applicable businesses at issue).
[42] Identification of key employees, however, does not mean that the
company must preserve every file that may contain any ESI created by
that key employee. For instance, in Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v.
Harding, Early, Follmer & Frailey, the court refused to impose sanctions
on the defendants for failure to preserve cache files in its computers that
the plaintiffs claimed contained infringing copies of the plaintiffs’
copyrighted works that the defendant had copied from the Web.120 The
117

Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 177; see also Allman, supra note 8, at 20-23.
See Sedona Principles, supra note 13, at 38. Sedona Principle 6 states, “[r]esponding
parties are best situated to evaluate the procedures, methodologies, and technologies
appropriate for preserving and producing their own electronic data and documents.” Id.
119
See supra notes 24-29, 33-35 and accompanying text.
120
Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. Harding, Early, Follmer & Frailey 497 F. Supp. 2d 627,
640 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
A cache file is a temporary storage area where frequently accessed data
can be stored for rapid access. When a computer accesses a web page,
it will sometimes store a copy of the web page in its cache in case the
page is needed again . . . . When the Harding firm viewed archived
screenshots of Healthcare Advocates’ website through the Wayback
118
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court said, “[t]o impose a sanction on the Harding firm for not preserving
temporary files that were not requested, and might have been lost the
second another website was visited, does not seem to be a proper situation
for an adverse spoliation inference.”121 Although the plaintiff apparently
only requested an adverse inference, the court’s ruling hopefully would
have been the same for any request for sanctions.

2. ALTERNATE SOURCES FOR THE SAME ESI
[43] Whether there are alternate sources for the same relevant documents
can also be an important consideration that addresses prejudice and the
need for sanctions.122 If there are alternate sources for the same
documents, there should be no need to preserve a duplicate set. However,
a judgment to allow automatic deletion because there are alternate sources
will often raise problems, including proving the alternate sources and
convincing the court that the availability of alternate sources is a
defense.123
3. TIME PERIODS FOR SUSPENSION
[44] If the litigation involves events only occurring in the past, then an
important task is determining for what time periods a party should retain
documents. In Apsley v. Boeing Co., the magistrate judge rejected the
request for “background information” and concluded that “a reasonable
period of time for discovery extends back to January 1, 2002, the earliest

Machine, copies of the screenshots may have been automatically stored
in the cache files of the Harding firm’s computers.
Id. at 640.
121
Id. at 642.
122
See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
123
Sedona Principles, supra note 13, at 45. Comment 8a to the Sedona Principles states:
The mere suspicion that a source may contain potentially relevant
information is not sufficient to demand the preservation of that source
‘just in case.’ Rather, the appropriate standard should be to preserve
information on and search sources where the producing party is
reasonably likely to locate potentially relevant information not
available from other available, searched sources.
Id.
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date of Boeing’s alleged scheme.” 124 Moreover, when past events are the
focus of litigation, documents generated after the basic events at issue may
be irrelevant.125
4. INACCESSIBLE ESI
[45] For ESI in inaccessible format, including back-up tapes, there should
be no obligation to preserve, unless the party in question has some notice
that there is a need to preserve the inaccessible ESI. This conclusion is
consistent with Sedona Principle 9, which provides, “[a]bsent a showing
of a special need and relevance, a responding party should not be required
to preserve, review, or produce deleted, shadowed, fragmented, or residual
electronically stored information.”126
[46] On the other hand, that conclusion is subject to the requirement in
Rule 26(b)(2)(B) that “[a] party need not provide discovery of
electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as
not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.” Presumably,
if a party has not notified the other side that it is allowing inaccessible ESI
with potentially relevant information to be destroyed, if that ESI is
destroyed, then the party allowing the destruction may be subject to
sanctions for spoliation if the opposing party complains once it learns of
the destruction.127 If the opposing party is notified of the pending

124

Apsley v. Boeing Co., No. 05-1368-MLB, 2007 WL 163201, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 18,
2007); see also Hayes v. Compass Group USA, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 363, 366 (D. Conn.
2001) (stating that the “[d]efendants will not be required to manually search their files for
complaints filed prior to January 1, 1998.”).
125
See McPeek v. Ashcroft, 212 F.R.D. 33, 35 (D.D.C. 2003) (stating that “it is unlikely
that people, working in an office, generate data about an event that is not
contemporaneous unless they have been charged with the responsibility to investigate
that event or to create some form of history about it.”)
126
Sedona Principles, supra note 13, at 49. Furthermore, Sedona Principle 11 says, “a
responding party may satisfy its good faith obligation to preserve and produce relevant
electronically stored information by using electronic tools and processes, such as data
sampling, searching, or the use of selection criteria, to identify data reasonably likely to
contain relevant information.” Id. at 57.
127
Allman, supra note 8, at 26 (stating that “absent agreement with opposing counsel,
unilateral preservation decisions about inaccessible sources always carry some risk of
post-production challenge for potential spoliation.”).
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destruction and does not object, the party destroying the documents would
appear to have a good argument on waiver.128
5. RISK OF UNILATERAL DECISIONS
[47] In light of the different views courts have expressed over the scope
of the duty to preserve, the relatively safe practice for a party, who has an
obligation to preserve, is to quickly and conscientiously determine what
reasonable preservation steps it will take and then notify the other party of
its conclusions. If the other party objects, then the court should resolve
the issue, and there will not be a dispute months or years later after the
destruction of the ESI.
[48] This is consistent with Sedona Principle 3 about the duty to preserve:
“Parties should confer early in discovery regarding the preservation and
production of electronically stored information when these matters are at
issue in the litigation and seek to agree on the scope of each party’s rights
and responsibilities.”129 This is also consistent with the statement in
Benton in connection with the duty to preserve that “at a minimum an
opportunity for inspection should be afforded a potentially responsible
party before relevant evidence is destroyed.”130 This is consistent with the
statement in Doe v. Norwalk Community College that “the defendants
128

Adoption and Amendments to Civil Rules, 234 F.R.D. 219 (2006).
A party’s identification of sources of electronically stored information
as not reasonably accessible does not relieve the party of its commonlaw or statutory duties to preserve evidence. Whether a responding
party is required to preserve unsearched sources of potentially
responsive information that it believes are not reasonably accessible
depends on the circumstances of each case. It is often useful for the
parties to discuss this issue early in discovery.
Id. Cf. Marketfare Annunciation, LLC v. United Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., No. 0607232, 2007 WL 3273440 (E.D. La. Nov. 5, 2007).
The Plaintiffs filed this motion for sanctions on September 18, 2007, on
the eve of the discovery deadline. . . . Given that trial is imminent and
that discovery has closed, the Court in its discretion declines to address
the merits of the Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions because doing so at
this juncture would be in direct contravention of the Scheduling Order.
Id. at *3-4.
129
Sedona Principles, supra note 13, at 21.
130
Benton v. Dlorah, Inc., No. 06-CV-2488-KHV, 2007 WL 3231431, at *4 (D. Kan.
Oct. 30, 2007) (emphasis added).
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could at least have conferred with Doe’s counsel regarding this question
of how to send a system-wide communication on document retention
without revealing Doe’s real name.” 131
[49] For instance, the Best Buy decision suggests that as a general matter,
a party with a database does not have to take a snapshot of that database
periodically to fulfill its duty to preserve, and may even be able to change
the format of the database. However, the court in Best Buy cautioned that
there had been no particularized request for information, so the decision
may have limited effect.132 In Turner, the court recognized that requests
for documents created after the duty to preserve attaches can create
additional burdens on the party receiving the request, but did not propose a
solution. A similar issue arises with metadata that continually or
periodically changes over time as the document changes.133
[50] Generally, the stronger argument would appear to be that a party
cannot delete the database or metadata, but can allow changes in databases
or metadata that occur in the normal course of business, unless perhaps the
dispute is about one event occurring in the past for which the party should
preserve a “snapshot.” Whichever position a party takes, however, such
issue would seem to be a perfect candidate for the requirement in Rule
26(f) that “the parties must, as soon as practicable . . . confer . . . to discuss
any issues relating to preserving discoverable information.”134 Especially
in areas that are not clear, parties acting unilaterally on preservation
131

Doe v. Norwalk Community College No. 3:04-CV-1976 (JCH), 2007 WL 2066497,
at *4, n.9 (D. Conn. July 16, 2007) (emphasis added). See also Withers, supra note 9, at
¶ 77:
Almost every survey, research project, or round of commentary
conducted on electronic discovery between 1999 and 2004 produced
the same fundamental finding – many of the problems associated with
electronic discovery can be worked out between opposing parties who
meet and confer early in the litigation, before discovery formally
begins, and who continue to communicate with each other and the court
throughout discovery.
132
See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
133
See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
134
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2); see also Sedona Principles, supra note 13, at 21 (stating that
“[p]arties should confer early in discovery regarding the preservation and production of
electronically stored information when these matters are at issue in the litigation and seek
to agree on the scope of each party’s rights and responsibilities.”).

32

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIV, Issue 3

proceed at their own risk because the court may disagree with the
unilateral decision, and there may be no case law to support that decision.
III. CONSIDERING MARGINAL UTILITY IN THE PRODUCTION OF
ACCESSIBLE ESI
A. PROPORTIONALITY
[51] Although remaining in obscurity for many years,135 the
proportionality provisions in Rule 26(b) apply to all discovery requests,
including requests for paper documents and ESI in accessible format.136
Indeed, the Supreme Court inserted the proportionality provisions in Rule
26(b)(1) in 1983, before the issue of inaccessible ESI had arisen.137
The Advisory Committee Notes for 1983 explained:
Rule 26(b)(1) has been amended to add a sentence to deal
with the problem of over-discovery. The objective is to
guard against redundant or disproportionate discovery by
giving the court the authority to reduce the amount of
discovery that may be directed to matters that are otherwise
proper subjects of inquiry.138
The Committee noted that a “court must apply the standards in an evenhanded manner that will prevent use of discovery to wage a war of
attrition or as a device to coerce a party, whether financially weak or
affluent.”139 The Committee said that the rules existing prior to the 1983
135

Marcus, supra note 18, at 613. (“[T]he proportionality provisions had remained in
obscurity for two decades, although they seemed to be getting more attention.”).
136
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).
137
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 214-15 (1983); Richard L. Marcus,
The 2000 Amendments to the Discovery Rules, 2001 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 22 (2001).
138
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. at 217 (emphasis added).
139
Id. at 218 (emphasis added). The new paragraph in Rule 26(b)(1) provided:
[t]he frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in
subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the
discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is
obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had
ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information
sought; or (iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive,

33

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIV, Issue 3

amendments had been “exploited to the disadvantage of justice,” and that
the practices of over-discovery “impose costs on an already overburdened
system and impede the fundamental goal of the ‘just and speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action.’”140
[52] In 1993, the Supreme Court put the proportionality provisions into a
separate paragraph, (b)(2), modified introductory text in the paragraph,
and amended subparagraph (iii) of the proportionality provision to its
current text.141 The Committee Notes stated that the changes were made
“to enable the court to keep tighter rein on the extent of discovery. The
information explosion of recent decades has greatly increased both the
potential cost of wide-ranging discovery and the potential for discovery to
be used as an instrument for delay or oppression.”142 In 1998, the Supreme
Court emphasized the discretion a district court has in limiting discovery
when it said, “Rule 26 vests the trial judge with broad discretion to tailor
discovery narrowly and to dictate the sequence of discovery.”143
[53] In 2000, the Supreme Court amended Rule 26(b)(1) to include the
following sentence: “[a]ll discovery is subject to the limitations imposed
by Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii).”144 The Committee Notes to this change
taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy,
limitations on the parties’ resources, and the importance of the issues at
stake in the litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative after
reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under subdivision (c).
Id. at 172.
140
Id. at 217 (citing Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 179 (Powell, J. concurring)).
141
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 403, 613-14
(1993); see also Stephen N. Surbin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical
Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 744-45 (1998).
142
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. at 638; see also
Surbin, supra note 141, at 744-45 (“We have begun to adapt to the notion of
‘proportionality’ in discovery. . . . The court may now consider ‘the importance of the
proposed discovery in resolving the issues.’”).
143
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) (emphasis added).
144
Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, 192 F.R.D.
340, 388 (2000). Amended Rule 26(b)(1) also narrowed the normal scope of discovery
from any matter relevant to the subject matter of the action to “any matter, not privileged,
that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party.” Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Square
Peg In a Round Hole? The 2000 Limitations on the Scope of Federal Civil Discovery, 69
TENN. L. REV. 13, 13 (2001). As a result of the 2006 amendments, discussed in the next
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explained that the purpose of the additional sentence was to “emphasize
the need for active judicial use of subdivision (b)(2) to control excessive
discovery.”145
[54] As a result of the 2006 amendments, the proportionality provisions
are now Rule 26(b)(2)(C), and provide that a court may limit the
frequency and extent of otherwise permitted discovery if the court
determines either:
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or
duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has ample opportunity by
discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs
of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in
resolving the issues. The court may act upon its own
initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion
under Rule 26(c).146
The Committee Notes to the 2006 Amendments state that, “[t]he
limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) continue to apply to all discovery of

paragraph of text of this article, what was Rule 26(b)(2)(i)(ii) and (iii) are now located at
Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(i),(ii) and (iii).
145
Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 192 F.R.D. at 390 (emphasis
added). In the 2000 amendments, the Supreme Court also limited the scope of discovery
without the intervention of the trial court to non-privileged matters relevant to claims or
defenses, rather than what the scope had previously been: anything relevant to the subject
matter of the litigation. Id. at 388-89. The Committee Notes explained, “[t]he
amendment is designed to involve the court more actively in regulating the breadth of
sweeping or contentious discovery.” Id. at 389.
146
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). Prior to December 1, 2006, what is now 26(b)(C) had
been part of 26(b)(2). With the 2006 amendments, what had been Rule 26(b)(2) was split
into Rule 26(b)(2)(A) and Rule 26(b)(2)(C), and 26(b)(2)(B) was added.
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electronically stored information, including that stored on reasonably
accessible electronic sources.”147
[55] Judge Scheindlin, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of
New York,148 similarly concluded that “it is important to recognize that a
party may still object, on the grounds set forth in Rule 26(b)(2)(C) – the
proportionality rule – to producing presumptively discoverable
information that falls in the so-called first tier” of reasonably accessible
information.149 Judge Scheindlin explained that “even when a source is
accessible, a court might not require production of information from that
source if, for example, the ‘discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative
or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.’”150 In Zubulake II, Judge
Scheindlin stated, “[w]hether electronic data is accessible or inaccessible
turns largely on the media on which it is stored.”151
[56] Before discussing cases after December 1, 2006 on discovery of
accessible ESI, what are the general lines between ESI in accessible
format and in inaccessible format? It is agreed that active on-line data,
near-line data (such as robotic storage and retrieval of optical disks), and
offline storage of optical disks that can effectively be searched when
inserted into a computer generally are considered accessible formats.152
On the other hand, it is agreed as a general matter that the following media
constitute inaccessible formats:153 backup tapes;154 erased, fragmented or
147

See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16 (2006), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EDiscovery_w_Notes.pdf.
148
Judge Scheindin also authored the landmark discovery decisions in Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg LLC. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D. N.Y. 2003)
(“Zubulake II”); 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D. N.Y. 2003) (“Zubulake III”); 220 F.R.D. 212
(S.D. N.Y. 2003) (“Zubulake IV”); 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D. N.Y. 2004) (“Zubulake V”).
149
Scheindlin, supra note 21; see also Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676,
681 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[r]ule 26(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
empowers district courts to limit the scope of discovery if ‘the discovery sought is
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive’”).
150
Scheindlin, supra note 21 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i)).
151
Zubulake II, 217 F.R.D. at 318.
152
Id. at 318-19.
153
Id. at 319.
154
See Sedona Glossary, supra note 110, at 5.
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damaged data;155 and legacy data stored on obsolete systems.156 Next, this
article turns to the cases on accessible ESI.
B. CASES DECIDED AFTER DECEMBER 1, 2006 INVOLVING INFORMATION IN
ACCESSIBLE FORMAT
[57] There is at least one federal decision, Peskoff v. Faber, that appears
to state Rule 26(b)(2)(C) only applies to inaccessible information and does
not apply to data in accessible format.157 In discussing a dispute between
the parties on the production of e-mail, Magistrate Judge Facciola stated
that:
[A]ccessible data must be produced at the cost of the
producing party; cost-shifting does not even become a
possibility unless there is first a showing of inaccessibility.
Thus, it cannot be argued that a party should ever be
relieved of its obligation to produce accessible data merely

ESI on backup tapes is generally recorded and stored sequentially,
rather than randomly, meaning in order to locate and access a specific
file or data set, all data on the tape preceding the target must be read
first, a time-consuming and inefficient process. Backup typically tapes
use data compression, which increases restoration time and expense,
given the lack of uniform standards governing data compression.
Id.
155

Id. at 14 (stating that “[d]eleted data is data that existed on the computer as live data
and which have been deleted by the computer system or end-user activity. Deleted data
may remain on storage media in whole or in part until they are overwritten or ‘wiped.’”);
see also Withers, supra note 9, at ¶ 14.
By now, all computer users should be aware that the action of
“deleting” an electronic file does little more than change the name and
eliminate reference to it in the operating system’s list of active files, a
situation aptly described by computer forensics expert Joan Feldman as
a “witness protection program for bad documents.”
Id. at ¶ 14 (quoting Joan Feldman, “Technology Experts Panel,” Presentation Before the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules at Hasting College of Law (Mar. 27, 2000).
156
Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318-20; see also Scheindlin, supra note 21, at 16; Sedona
Glossary, supra note 110, at 30 (stating that “[l]egacy [d]ata is ESI . . . created or stored
by the use of software and/or hardware that has become obsolete or replaced. . . . Legacy
data may be costly to restore or reconstruct when required for investigation or litigation
analysis or discovery.”)
157
Peskoff v. Faber, 240 F.R.D. 26 (D.D.C. 2007).
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because it may take time and effort to find what is
necessary.158
The second sentence is accurate because under 26(b)(2)(C)(iii), a court
cannot limit production simply because of costs; it must balance costs
against the likely benefits and other factors. However, the first sentence that there can only be cost-shifting if the information sought is accessible is not accurate.
[58] The court in the first Peskoff opinion cited two cases, Zubulake v.
UBS Warburg LLC159 and Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders.160
Interestingly, neither Zubulake nor Oppenheimer stand for the proposition
that a party can only be relieved of its obligation to produce documents if
there has been a showing of inaccessibility. In Zubulake, before the
adoption of 26(b)(2)(B), Judge Scheindlin did state that the presumption
was the responding party must bear the expense of complying with
discovery requests,161 but she also said that under the Rule 26
proportionality test, a court could condition discovery on the requesting
party’s payment of costs of discovery.162 Although inaccessible data from
backup tapes was at issue in Zubulake, the court’s statements about cost
shifting were not limited to inaccessible data. Saying the presumption is
that the producing party must bear the cost of production, as the court said
in Zubulake, is different than saying the producing party must always bear
the cost of production, as the court suggested in the first quoted sentence
above in Peskoff.
[59] In Oppenheimer, the United States Supreme Court similarly (to the
court in Zubulake) said that:
[T]he presumption is that the responding party must bear
the expense of complying with discovery requests, but he
may invoke the district’s court’s discretion under Rule
26(c) to grant orders protecting him from ‘undue burden or
158

Id. at 31.
Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 280
160
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978).
161
Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 283.
162
Id.
159
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expense’ in doing so, including orders conditioning
discovery on the requesting party’s payment of the cost of
discovery.163
The Court did not limit this statement to inaccessible information.164
[60] In a subsequent decision in Peskoff, Magistrate Judge Facciola
seemed to modify his previous statement in the original Peskoff decision,
or at least put it in different context. 165 He stated that when an objection
is made, “the search for data, even if accessible, must be justified under
the relevancy standard of Rule 26(b)(1).”166 He added:
The point is that balancing under Rule 26(b)(2)(C) was not
invoked here to oppose the search, and I cannot accept the
proposition that Faber may be relieved of searching
accessible data when he does not argue that the search is
not justified by the potential relevancy of what may be
found.167
The court added:
I am hard pressed to understand why I am required to, sua
sponte, balance utility against cost and relieve Faber of
searching accessible, relevant data any more than I would
have to do the same balancing before I required him to look
through the file cabinet outside his office for a paper file.168

163

Oppenheimer, 437 U.S. at 358.
Id. Oppenheimer involved the propriety of shifting the costs of notifying a class of the
pendency of the action. The discovery rule was only mentioned to draw an analogy. Id.
165
Peskoff v. Faber, 244 F.R.D. 54 (D.D.C. 2007).
166
Id. at 63.
167
Id. In fact, the last sentence in Rule 26(b)(2)(C) allows a court to limit discovery “on
its own initiative after reasonable notice.” However, certainly Magistrate Judge
Facciola’s statement that the producing party must make an objection states the practice
in his court and is a reasonable position. How is a court able to know when discovery is
excessive unless a party objects and brings it to the attention of the court?
168
Peskoff, 244 F.R.D. at 62-63.
164
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In other words, the court in Peskoff recognized that a court can limit the
production of relevant, accessible data under the proportionality
provisions in 26(b)(2)(C).169
[61] Other decisions since the effective date of the ESI rules support the
conclusion that a court can condition or limit the requested production of
accessible information. Bolton v. Sprint/United Management Company
was an age discrimination case that thirteen plaintiffs filed, challenging a
reduction in force by the defendants and alleging violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act. 170 The plaintiffs moved to compel the
defendants to produce certain accessible ESI, electronic files in active
databases. Although not citing 26(b)(2)(C), the court said it must balance
the burden on the producing party against the benefit to the discovering
party and should allow the discovery, unless the hardship was
“unreasonable compared to the benefits to be secured from the
discovery.”171 Balancing the likely benefits against the burden, the court
rejected six of the plaintiffs’ fourteen requests for documents.
[62] In Hill v. Eddie Bauer, the court rejected a request for accessible
comprehensive wage and hour documents. 172 In Hill, the plaintiffs filed
individual and class action law suits against Eddie Bauer, alleging, among
other things, that Eddie Bauer violated the California labor code for
unpaid overtime, and sought, for all putative class members,
169

Id. (“[A] party must search available electronic systems to answer any discovery
requests not objected to . . . .”).
170
Bolton v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 05-2361-JWL, 2007 WL 756644, at *1 (D.
Kan. Mar. 8, 2007).
171
Id. at *3. Interestingly, the court concluded that the request for certain data within a
database was overly broad, because the department in Sprint that would have been
responsible for retrieving the information was understaffed and that responding to the
request would take at least eighty hours. Id. at *4. In contrast, the court concluded that a
request for information in native format pertained to all employees selected for
termination and a reduction in force during certain time periods, even though the
testimony that the process required to respond to this request would take far in excess of
the eighty hours needed to respond to request 1. Id. It would appear the difference was
the more direct relevance, and thus benefit, of the information sought in request 3
(pertaining to employees who had been selected for termination), compared to request 1
(information concerning all employees).
172
Hill v. Eddie Bauer, 242 F.R.D. 556, 563 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (indicating that the records
involved certain reports that could be generated electronically).
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documentation relating to the hours, wages, business related expenses,
repayment of wages to employer, termination wages, meal breaks, and rest
breaks.173 The court relied, in part, on Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides that the federal rules “shall be construed and
administered to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action.”174 The court stated that:
To track historical sales of Eddie Bauer merchandise to
employees for a period longer than the immediately
preceding six months, hard copy sales records must be
gathered manually and reviewed by a live individual. Sales
records [were] maintained both at [defendant’s] corporate
campus in Redmond, Washington as well as off-site.175
The court concluded that it would be unduly burdensome to respond to
these document requests, but that the plaintiff was entitled to responsive
sample information to pursue class action certification.176
[63] Another court also limited pre-certification class discovery for
information that included data in accessible format, based on balancing
burdens and benefits, in O’Bar v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc.177 A
particular issue in this employment discrimination case was whether the
plaintiffs had standing to represent the class.178 The court limited
precertification discovery to managers and officers at the regional, district
and national level.179

173

Id. at 560
Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
175
Id. at 563.
176
Id. at 564. The court stated, however, that it might reconsider its limitation on the
discovery of this request “in the event plaintiff’s experts are unable to devise some
statistical analysis based on sampling data, and opine they need data from all 1,800
putative class members.” Id. at 565.
177
O’Bar v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., No. 5:04-cv-00019-W, 2007 WL 1299180
(W.D.N.C. May 2, 2007). The court limited pre-class production not simply with respect
to information it deemed inaccessible, but did include specific guidelines for information
not reasonably accessible.
178
Id. at *1.
179
Id. at *3.
174
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[64] The court in Fifty-Six Hope Road Music Ltd. v. Mayah Collections,
Inc. also limited discovery of accessible information after expressly
considering the Rule 26(b)(2)(C) balancing factors. 180 Fifty-Six Hope
Road was a case alleging trademark infringement and the defense of
abandonment of the mark. The court said that under Rule 26(b)(2)(C):
[T]he court on its own initiative after reasonable notice or
pursuant to a motion under Rule 26(c), may limit the
discovery sought if it determines that it is unreasonably
cumulative or duplicative or the burden and expenses of the
discovery outweighs its likely benefit taking into account
the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation and the importance of the proposed discovery in
resolving the issues.181
[65] The court in Fifty-Six Hope Road then denied the requests for all
advertisements and documents evidencing use of the marks at issue since
the first date of use.182 The court said:
[E]ven some minor or limited use in a given year is
sufficient to defeat a claim of abandonment. The Court
will, therefore, order that, to the extent they have not done
so, Plaintiffs produce representative documents showing
that they made use of the marks in the years since the mark
was first used.183
[66] In Haka v. Lincoln County, the requested information included active
data on external hard drives – accessible information.184 Referring to the
balancing factors in 26(b)(2)(C), the court took into account the dollar
amount at issue in the case, rejected the request to copy and produce the
hard drives in their entirety, and said instead that:
180

Fifty-Six Hope Road Music, Ltd. v. Mayah Collections, Inc., No. 2:05-cv-0105-KJDGWF, 2007 WL 1726558 (D. Nev. June 11, 2007). The disputed requests included
advertisements and apparently other paper documents.
181
Id. at *4 (emphasis added).
182
Id. at *10.
183
Id.
184
Haka v. Lincoln County, 246 F.R.D. 577 (W.D. Wis. 2007)
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[F]airness and efficiency require the parties to proceed
incrementally, limiting the initial search to the e-mail
stored on the hard drives. Plaintiff is required to narrow his
search terms to the narrowest set with which he is
comfortable. Any additional searches shall occur only by
joint agreement or court order. The parties will divide the
cost of performing plaintiff’s term searches of the e-mail
50/50.185
In other words, the court ordered cost sharing, even though the e-mails
were in accessible format.
[67] In Smith v. Café Asia, in responding to a request for discovery of
images stored on a cell phone – accessible information – Magistrate Judge
Facciola said that “relevancy alone does not entitle a requesting party to
carte blanche in discovery,” citing the Supreme Court’s decision in
Crawford-El v. Britton. 186 Magistrate Judge Facciola also pointed out that
admissibility of the discovery being sought could be an important
consideration, even though information sought in discovery generally did
not have to be admissible, but only reasonably likely to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. If the items sought in discovery were,
in fact, items the requesting party would seek to admit at trial, then “the
question of discoverability is inseparable from admissibility.”187
Magistrate Judge Facciola ordered that the images on the cell phone be
preserved, but that only one attorney for the plaintiff be designated by the
defendant to inspect the images, so subsequently both the plaintiff and the
defendant could make an argument on admissibility to the trial judge.
[68] The production of e-mails in Lotus Notes format, an accessible
format, was at issue in Parkdale America, LLC v. Travelers Casualty and
Surety Company of America, Inc.188 Parkdale was a declaratory judgment
185

Id. at 579. There would also be inaccessible data on the hard drives, such as deleted
files. However, this decision addressed accessible ESI and limited the search for
accessible ESI.
186
Smith v. Café Asia, 246 F.R.D. 19, 20 ( D.D.C. 2007) (citing Crawford-El v. Britton,
523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998)).
187
Id. at 20.
188
ParkDale Am., LLC. v. Travelers Cas. & Surety Co. of Am., No. 3:06CV78-R, 2007
WL 4165247 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 19, 2007).
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action to determine whether the insurance company had a duty to defend
and indemnify Parkdale in an antitrust lawsuit. The court applied Rule
26(b)(2)(C), noted that the insurance policy at issue in the case was over
$2.7 million and the cost of producing the e-mails not more than $20,000,
and concluded that the “Plaintiffs have not articulated a sufficient basis to
relieve them of their obligation to produce e-mails.”189 The court also
concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the e-mails were
“not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”190 It is
unclear if the court thought “not reasonably accessible” was a separate test
from the 26(b)(2)(C) test.
[69] In PSEG Power New York, Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., a
dispute over a construction contract, as the result of some incompatibility
between the software used by PSEG and the vendor, PSEG initially
produced documents that had been attached to e-mails separately from the
e-mails. 191 The court said the e-mails/attachments still existed in their
original pst files, with nothing lost. PSEG could collect the documents
attached to the e-mails by running another search, but at an additional cost
that PSEG did not want to bear. The court applied the 26(b)(2)(C)
proportionality test and rejected switching any cost to Alberici, largely
because originally, the “attachments should have been produced with their
corresponding e-mails as such are kept in the usual course of business.”192
The court did acknowledge, however, that the presumption that the
producing party bears the expense of complying with discovery requests
“may place an undue burden or cost upon the responding party, especially
when it comes to electronic discovery.”193
[70] The court ordered the production of a database in Ryan v. Stanton
Island University Hospital.194 The plaintiff, on behalf of her deceased
husband, sued the defendant for medical malpractice, fraud, and other
claims. The discovery issue revolved around a database of patients who
189

Id. at *13.
Id. at *12.
191
PSEG Power NY, Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-657, 2007 WL
2687670, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. 2007)
192
Id. at *12.
193
Id. at *10
194
Ryan v. Staten Is. Univ. Hosp., No. 04-CV-2666, 2006 WL 3497875 (E.D.N.Y. Dec.
5, 2006).
190
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had received radiosurgery, and the defendant had produced a paper
document that purported to be a printout of a database listing all of the
patients who were treated with radiosurgery, their diagnoses, years of
treatment, and types and locations of cancer, through December 31, 2002.
The court ordered the defendant to produce a complete and true copy of
the database.195 The court said, “[p]ursuant to Rule 26(b), any information
that is not privileged and is ‘reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence’ may be discovered.”196 The producing party had
objected on the grounds that the production would reveal privileged or
other confidential information, not on the grounds that the information
would be cumulative or was simply a fishing expedition. In its order, the
court attempted to address the privilege/confidentiality objection in the
limits placed on production.197
C. PRINCIPLES
[71] Courts have the authority under Rule 26(b)(2)(C) to restrict and put
conditions on discovery of relevant and accessible documents and ESI.198
195

Id. at *8.
Id. at *4. The court appeared to treat the database as accessible ESI. Requests for
information from databases may not always be construed as a request for information
from an accessible source. For instance, in discussing inaccessible formats, the
Committee Notes for the ESI Rules said, “Examples from current technology
include…databases that were designed to create certain information in certain ways and
that cannot readily create very different kinds or forms of information.” 234 F.R.D. at
331.
197
The court ordered production of the database “in electronic and hard copy, subject to
the redaction only of the patients’ names, addresses, telephone numbers and social
security numbers, and specifically stamped ‘REDACTED’ on each and every entry for
which information was redacted.” Ryan, 2006 WL 3497875 at *8. The court did not
explain in the decision how a completed database could be produced in electronic format,
with REDACTED stamped on each element that, in fact, was redacted.
198
The amended rule does not say that judges may only consider cost allocation if
the subject of the discovery is electronically stored information; if the
electronically stored information is not reasonably accessible, or if the
costs that the producing party is seeking to shift go beyond the costs of
forensic work necessary to make certain information accessible.
Rosenthal, supra note 1. Phrases taken out of context are often misleading. The
statement in Peskoff that “accessible data must be produced” is subject to the
qualification in the next Peskoff decision - unless the producing party objects to such
production. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28, 35-39. The statement in Ryan
that a party may discover any non-privileged information likely to lead to the discovery
196
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The 2007 decisions in Bolton, Hill, O’Bar, Fifty-Six Hope Road, Haka,
and Smith support this position.199 As the Committee Notes state, “the
limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) continue to apply to all discovery of
electronically stored information, including that stored on reasonably
accessible electronic sources.”200
[72] Another 2007 decision, Christian v. Central Records Service,
involving a requested search for printed copies of e-mails in an individual
employment discrimination case, also supports the application of Rule
26(b)(2)(C) to limit requests for production of relevant information in
accessible format. 201 In Christian, the plaintiff requested “all of her emails from the date of her hire until the date of her termination,” and
Central Records responded that the requested e-mails “have been deleted
in the normal course of business.”202 The plaintiff said she always printed
out her e-mails and asked the court to order Central Records to search
several hundred thousand boxes in storage for those e-mails. The court
rejected the request, stating, “[t]he ability to discovery and retrieve the emails in question would be unnecessarily burdensome to the Defendant.
Even if the court would order a sample of the various boxes the sample
size, to be effective, would be cost prohibitive and may not produce any of
the requested e-mails.”203
of admissible evidence is also subject to the same qualification - unless the producing
party raises a valid objection to its production. In Ryan, the court cited National
Congress for Puerto Rican Rights v. City of New York, 194 F.R.D. 88, 92 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) for the proposition of what information may be discovered. In National Congress,
Judge Scheindlin made the general statement that all relevant materials likely to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence are discoverable, and then added the qualification,
“Given the breadth of discovery in federal actions, all of the documents listed above are
relevant—whether they are discoverable is a different matter.” Id. at 92. In other words,
whether some information is within the scope of permissible discovery is a separate issue
than whether the court should allow discovery of that information.
199
See supra text accompanying notes 170-84.
200
234 F.R.D. at 339 (emphasis added).
201
Christian v. Cent. Record Serv., No. 2:06-CR-2198-RTD, 2007 WL 3094513 (W.D.
Ark. Oct. 19, 2007). Central Records Service provides record storage and retrieval
services for other businesses and to individuals. Id. at *1.
202
Id. It is not clear whether the deletion occurred before the obligation to preserve ESI
attached, and in any case, the decision does not mention any motion for sanctions for the
deletion of the e-mails.
203
Id. at *2 (citing Rule 26(b)(2) and Roberts v. Shawnee Mission Ford, Inc., 352 F.3d
358, 361 (8th Cir. 2003)). The paper documents in boxes were in accessible format.
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[73] Monetary expense does not even have to be an express factor to limit
production under Rule 26(b)(2)(C). A court can limit discovery if “the
information is obtainable from some other source that is more
convenient,”204 or if the requesting party has already had ample
opportunity to obtain the requested information.205
Under Rule
26(b)(2)(C)(i), a court can limit discovery if “the discovery sought is
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative.”206
[74] As the modifications to Rule 26(b) over the last twenty-five years
show, Rule 26(b) instructs the parties to engage in, and the courts to
enforce, discovery proportionate to the circumstances of the case.207
Requests for “all information” pertaining to a particular topic often are
overly broad.208 When parties object, courts should narrow requests to
search all the e-mails and documents of all employees, or search all
servers of a company, including cache files, when it is reasonably
anticipated that the documents and e-mails of the key employees are likely
to be found on specific servers, or a limited sample of information may

However, the cost of retrieving and searching the boxes caused the court to determine
that production would be unnecessarily burdensome. When the only issue arguing
against production of accessible information is cost, as appeared to be the case in
Christian, Parkdale and PSEG, it is reasonable to conclude the objecting party should
have a more difficult time persuading the court to reject production than when there are
additional objections to production, such as the request is duplicative or an unnecessary
fishing expedition unlikely to produce additional, important information in light of what
has already been produced.
204
FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i).
205
FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(ii).
206
Of course, a party who objects to a request as “unreasonably cumulative” can attempt
to put a dollar value on the amount of staff time required to comply with the request, but
only 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) expressly refers to “expense.”
207
Cf., In re Microcrystalline Cellulose Antitrust Litig., 221 F.R.D. 428, 430 (E.D. Pa.
2004) (stating that the “plaintiffs’ request for sales data through the end of 2003 is
unreasonable given the minimum potential benefits of this information”).
208
See, e.g., Johnson v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 236 F.R.D. 535, 542 (D. Kan. 2006);
Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 03-2200-JWL-DJW, 2006 WL 2734465, at *7
(D. Kan. Sept. 25, 2006); BG Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. Am. Equity Ins. Co., No. Civ.A.
04-3408, 2005 WL 1309048, at *5 (E.D. La. May 18, 2005); Byers v. Ill. State Police,
No. 99 C 8105, 2002 WL 1264004, at *11 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002); Cardenas v. Dorel,
232 F.R.D. 377, 382 (D. Kan. 2005); Wright v. AmSouth Bancorporation, 320 F. 3d
1198, 1205 (11th Cir. 2003).
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serve the same purpose more efficiently.209 Courts should also reject or
narrow vague requests that will require the producing party to spend a lot
of time evaluating documents to determine if they are responsive.210

209

Cf. Fifty-Six Hope Road Music, Ltd. v. Mayah Collections, Inc., No. 2:05-cv-0105KJD-GWF, 2007 WL 1726558 (D. Nev. June 11, 2007); Wells v. XPEDX, No. 8:05-CV2193-T-EAJ, 2007 WL 1200955 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2007); Semsroth v. City of Wichita,
No. 04-1245-MLB, 2006 WL 33885024 (D. Kan. Spet. 5, 2006); Quinby v. Westlb AG,
No. 04Civ.7406(WHP)(HBP), 2005 WL 3453908 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Quinby v. Westlb
AG, No. 04Civ.7406 WHP HBP, 2006 WL 59521 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Quinby v. Westlb
AG, 245 F.R.D. 94 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2006); supra text accompanying notes 180-86.
Where samples are identified for initial production, it may be logical to expect a
stipulation that the fact at issue will be decided based on the sample, or an agreement to
preserve the more extensive information not included in the sample, in case it was later
determined the sample was not sufficient. Cache is “a dedicated, high speed storage
location which can be used for the temporary storage of frequently used data. As data
may be retrieved more quickly from cache than the original storage location, cache
allows applications to run more quickly. Web site contents often reside in cached storage
locations on a hard drive.” See Sedona Conference Glossary, supra note 110.
210
Williams v. Sprint/United Management Co., No. 03-2200-JWL-DJW, 2006 WL
2734465, *7 (D. Kan. Sept. 25, 2006) (stating that "[c]ourts may find requests overly
broad when they are 'couched in such broad language as to make arduous the task of
deciding which of numerous documents may conceivably fall within [their] scope.'”
(emphasis added)). See also Sedona Principle 4 (stating that “[d]iscovery requests for
electronically stored information should be as clear as possible, while responses and
objections to discovery should disclose the scope and limits of the production.”). In such
case, the producing party may have to produce a subset of the requested information.
See, e.g., Johnson, 236 F.R.D. at 542 (stating that “[d]espite the overly broad nature of
Requests 7, 8, and 10 on their face, the Court is mindful of a party’s duty under the
federal rules to respond to the extent that discovery requests are not objectionable”).
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[75] As in Haka,211 limitations on key word searches can make sense.212
No method of reviewing ESI electronically, so far, produces very accurate
results.213 Production based on broad word searches alone is likely: (1) to
result in the over-production of proprietary material that the receiving
party has no right to receive but receives anyway;214 or (2) to require a
large amount of time spent by the producing party individually reviewing
211

Haka v. Lincoln County, 246 F.R.D. 577, 579 (W.D. Wis. 2007).
See also Quinby v. Westlb AG, 245 FRD 94,106 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that
“[f]ollowing multiple conferences before me, the electronic discovery as it pertained to emails was limited to searches of seventeen current and former WestLB employees,
utilizing a limited number of search terms and, in some instances, more limited time
frames.”); Alexander v. Fed. Bureau of Investigations, 194 F.R.D. 316, 335 (D.D.C.
2000):
The EOP [Executive Office of the President] responds, however, that
the burden of searching the e-mails of those individuals with such
attenuated knowledge to any relevant issues far outweighs any likely
benefit that would be obtained by adding these persons to the list. The
court agrees with the EOP's argument. The court further notes, as
discussed above, that to the extent that any of these persons sent or
received e-mails to or from those persons already included in the search
who are alleged to be directly involved in the matters at issue, those emails will already be captured by the more limited search.
Id.
213
Paul & Baron, supra note 1, at ¶ 40.
[T]he assumption on the part of lawyers that any form of present-day
search methodology will fully find ‘all’ or ‘nearly’ all available
documents in a large, heterogeneous collection of data is wrong in the
extreme. A leading study by Blair & Maron, where the legal teams
only found 20% of the responsive documents in a large subway crash
case, has been widely cited as recognizing this inherent problem.
Id. See also The Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on
the Use of Search & Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 8
THE SEDONA CONF. J. 189, 199-204 (Fall 2007).
214
In explaining the general limitation on the scope of discovery in 2000 to nonprivileged matters relevant to the claims or defenses in the case rather than the subject
matter of the case, the Committee said the change “signals to the parties that they have no
entitlement to discovery to develop new claims or defenses that are not already identified
in the pleadings.” Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 192 F.R.D. 340, 389
(2000). Production based simply on word searches can provide free fishing for the
requesting party into uncharted and unclaimed waters, in spite of the intention of the
rules. Of course, word searches can miss relevant documents also. However, initial
“under-production” from word searches can be corrected over time through stages of
discovery. In other words, start with certain word searches and compare the results with
what would reasonably be expected.
212
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the documents flagged by the electronic search to determine which of the
documents flagged by the computer are, in fact, responsive and not
privileged.
[76] Court restrictions on the timing of discovery also can be appropriate.
For instance, as long as the parties preserve the information, there is no
reason to approve broad class-wide discovery before the court has
determined whether there is a valid class.215 Similarly, since the
appropriate remedy in a case, if any, may change over time, as long as the
parties preserve the information, it may make sense to limit discovery of
damages until later in the case.216
[77] As in the case of preservation decisions, counsel and parties cannot
safely take decisions on overbreadth, or other production decisions, into
their own hands—they must object if they are not going to produce.217 For
instance, in Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp.,218 Qualcomm responded
to a request for production of documents by stating, “Qualcomm will
produce non-privileged relevant and responsive documents describing
Qualcomm's participation in the JVT, if any, which can be located after a
reasonable search.” However, Qualcomm did not produce thousands of
pages of ESI (e-mail) that the court deemed relevant, and Qualcomm
argued the court should take no action when the failure to produce was
discovered because Broadcom had not objected to Qualcomm’s discovery
response. The court rejected this argument as “gamesmanship”219 and
215

See, e.g., Hill v. Eddie Bauer, 242 F.R.D. 556 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Rebman v. Follett
Higher Educ. Group, Inc. 2007 U.S. Dist. WL 1303031, at * 3 (M.D. Fla. May 3, 2007).
216
Rebman, 2007 WL 130303, at *3.
217
See Sedona Principles, supra note 13 (stating that “[d]iscovery requests for
electronically stored information should be as clear as possible, while responses and
objections to discovery should disclose the scope and limits of the production.”).
218
Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. WL 66932, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Jan.
7, 2008).
219
Id. at *8 n. 4.
This argument is indicative of the gamesmanship Qualcomm engaged
in throughout this litigation. Why should Broadcom file a motion to
compel when Qualcomm agreed to produce the documents? What
would the court have compelled: Qualcomm to do what it already said
it would do? Should all parties file motions to compel to preserve their
rights in case the other side hides documents?
Id.
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ruled that “agreeing to produce certain categories of documents and then
not producing all of the documents that fit within such a category is
unacceptable. Qualcomm's conduct warrants sanctions.”220
[78] Unnecessary discovery and secrecy both burden the judicial process.
The Supreme Court adopted the proportionality rule to enable courts and
parties to constrain excessive discovery. In light of the ESI explosion,
Rule 26(b)(2)(C), used openly, is perhaps today, an even more important
tool to restrain excessive discovery than it was in 1983.
IV. PRODUCTION OF REGULARLY CHANGING ESI
A. METADATA
1. DEFINITIONS
[79] The possible relevance and use of metadata221 can vary significantly,
depending on the type of metadata involved.222 Although this article cites
the definitions of types of metadata from the Sedona Glossary, there are
not generally agreed upon definitions of the types of metadata.223

220

Id. at *9.
Sedona Conference Glossary for E-Discovery and Digital Information Management
(the “Sedona Glossary”) defines metadata as:
[I]nformation about a particular data set or document which describes
how, when and by whom it was collected, created, accessed, modified
and how it is formatted. Can be altered intentionally or inadvertently.
Can be extracted when native files are converted to image. Some
metadata, such as file dates and sizes, can easily be seen by users; other
metadata can be hidden or embedded and unavailable to computer users
who are not technically adept. Metadata is generally not reproduced in
full form when a document is printed.
Sedona Glossary, supra note 110, at 28.
222
Allman, supra note 8, at *31 (stating that “[t]he need for metadata and embedded data
varies depending upon the type of ESI involved and the issues in the case.”).
223
Lucia Cucu, The Requirement for Metadata Production Under Williams v.
Sprint/United Management Co.: An Unnecessary Burden for Litigants Engaged in
Electronic Discovery, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 229, 236 (2007) (stating that “metadata
is not clearly defined . . . different courts have used the word ‘metadata’ to mean different
things”).
221
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[80] The Sedona Glossary defines user-added metadata as, “data or work
product created by a user while reviewing a document, including
annotations and subjective coding information.”224 This type of metadata
can often be privileged or constitute attorney-work product. Some place
the “track changes” function and the invisible spreadsheet formulas of
Microsoft Word in this category.225 Arguably, this type of metadata is
more likely to be relevant than other types of metadata, and not otherwise
available in the document. For instance, although the author and date of
creation are often very important and revealed in document metadata,
which is discussed next, information about author and date is often
apparent from the document itself.
[81] The Sedona Glossary defines document metadata as, “data about the
document stored in the document, as opposed to document content. Often
this data is not immediately viewable in the software application used to
create/edit the document but often can be accessed via a ‘Properties’ view.
Examples include document author and company, and create and revision
dates.”226
[82] The Sedona Glossary defines e-mail metadata as, “data stored in the
e-mail about the e-mail. Often this data is not even viewable in the e-mail
client application used to create the e-mail. The amount of e-mail
metadata available for a particular e-mail varies greatly depending on the
e-mail system.”227 This metadata can include “internet protocol addresses,
the dates the e-mail was sent, received, replied to and forwarded, and . . .
blind carbon copy (‘bcc’) information and sender address book data.”228
[83] The Sedona Glossary defines file system metadata as, “data that can
be obtained or extracted about a file from the file system storing the file.
224

See Sedona Glossary, supra note 110, at 45.
Sedona Principles, supra note 13, at 3-4 (referring to formulas in spreadsheets as
metadata); Favro, supra note 19, at *7-10 (discussing track changes and formulas as
metadata). Cf. Cucu, supra note 223, at 229, 236 (stating that “[t]he Williams court
[Williams v. Sprint/United Management Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 647 (D. Kan. 2005)] . . .
viewed spreadsheet formulas as metadata, but it is not clear why such formulas are not a
part of the document instead.”).
226
See Sedona Glossary, supra note 110, at 16.
227
Id. at 18.
228
Favro, supra note 19, at *9.
225
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Examples include file creation time, last modification time, and last access
time.” 229
[84] In considering the production of metadata, it is necessary to consider
Rule 34 on the form of production, even though that Rule and the
Committee Notes do not take a position on whether a responding party
must produce metadata.230 The next section, therefore, reviews the
applicable parts of Rule 34 and the Committee Notes.
2. RULE 34
[85] Rule 34(b)(1)(C) provides that the requesting party “may specify the
form or forms in which electronically stored information is to be
produced.”231 Rule 34(b)(2)(D) provides that the responding party may
object to the form in which the requesting party asks for the ESI, and if it
does object, it must specify the form in which it proposes to produce the
ESI.232 Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(ii) provides that absent a court order or
stipulation, “[i]f a request does not specify a form for producing
electronically stored information, a party must produce it in a form or
forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form
or forms.”233 If either party raises objection to the form, then of course the
court decides the form.234
229

See Sedona Principles, supra note 13, at 4 (stating generally “metadata will have no
evidentiary value - it does not matter when a document was printed, or who typed the
revisions, or what edits were made before the document was circulated.”).
230
Cucu, supra note 223, at 224.
231
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(C).
232
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(D).
233
FED. R. CIV. P. 34, Committee Notes, 1993 Amendments.
A number of commentators expressed concern that ‘a form ordinarily
maintained’ required ‘native format’ production, which can have
disadvantages ranging from an inability to redact, leading to privilege
problems; an inability to bates-stamp the ‘document’ for purposes of
litigation management and control . . . ; and the receiving party’s ability
to create ‘documents’ from the produced native format data and present
them back to the producing party as deposition or proposed trial
exhibits that, while based on the native format data and produced, are
totally unfamiliar to the producing party.
Id.
234
FED. R. CIV. P. 34, Committee Notes, 2006 Amendment.
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[86] The Committee Notes on Rule 34 state, “[i]f the responding party
ordinarily maintains the information it is producing in a way that makes it
searchable by electronic means, the information should not be produced in
a form that removes or significantly degrades this feature.”235 In addition,
the Committee Notes say, “[u]nder some circumstances, the responding
party may need to provide some reasonable amount of technical support,
information on application software, or other reasonable assistance to
enable the requesting party to use the information.”236 The Committee
Notes also warn:
A party that responds to a discovery request by simply
producing electronically stored information in a form of its
choice, without identifying that form in advance of
production . . . runs a risk that the requesting party can
show that the produced form is not reasonably usable and
that it is entitled to production of some or all of the
information in an additional form.237
[87] The language of the Rule and Committee Notes add a consideration
beyond relevance to responding to requests for production of metadata.
The additional consideration is that metadata can assist in making the
“document” part of the ESI more usable, and that in turn may require the
production of metadata, even though by itself, the metadata is not
relevant.238

235

Id.
Id.
237
Id.
238
Perhaps an analogy is the requirement imposed by some courts that the producing
party provide an index or other direction for the production of paper documents. See,
e.g., Ex rel. Edmondson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 05-CV-329-GKF-SAJ, 2007 U.S. Dist.
WL 1498973, at *5 (N.D. Okla. May 17, 2007) (stating, “[T]o the extent the producing
party elects to produce responsive documents as they are kept in the ordinary course of
business, it must either direct the responding party to the location or locations within its
files where documents responsive to each of their specific requests may be found, or
provide a key or index to assist the responding party in locating the responsive
documents.”); Wagner v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 606, 611 (D. Neb. 2001).
236
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3. METADATA CASES
[88] The plaintiff sought to compel the production of “metadata for
virtually all records maintained in electronic form which have been
produced to date” in Kentucky Speedway LLC v. National Ass’n of Stock
Car Auto Racing, Inc.239 The court disagreed with what it said was the
decision in Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., “that a producing party
‘should produce electronic documents with the metadata intact unless the
party timely objects… the parties agree that the metadata should not be
produced, or the producing party requests a protective order.’”240 The
court agreed with the decision of Wyath v. Impax Labs., Inc. that emerging
standards on ESI “‘appear to articulate a general presumption against the
production of metadata.’” 241
[89] The court in Kentucky Speedway continued that “in most cases for
most documents, metadata does not provide relevant information….
Depending on the format, the metadata may identify the typist but not the
document’s author, or even just a specific computer from which the
document originated or was generated.”242 The court concluded that “[t]o
the extent that plaintiff seeks metadata for a specific document or
documents where date and authorship information is unknown but
relevant, plaintiff should identify that document or documents by Bates
Number or by other reasonably identifying features.”243 Whether the court
239

Kentucky Speedway, LLC v. Nat’l Ass’n of Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., No. 05-138WOB, 2007 WL 4260517, at *21 (E.D. Ken. Dec. 18, 2006).
240
Id. at *22 (quoting Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 652 (D.
Kan. 2005)). Although the quote from Williams is accurate, the decision in Williams
does not, in fact, suggest that metadata should generally be produced. Referring to
Sedona Principle 12, the court said that “emerging standards of electronic discovery
appear to articulate a general presumption against the production of metadata, but provide
a clear caveat when the producing party is aware or should be reasonably aware that
particular metadata is relevant to the dispute.” Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 652. Williams
simply advises producing parties that they are in the best position to object to the
production of the relevance or privileged nature of any metadata, and thus have the
obligation to object, when appropriate. Id. at 652. (holding “that party already has
access to the metadata and is in the best position to determine whether producing it is
objectionable”).
241
Kentucky Speedway, 2007 WL 4260517, at *22 (quoting Wyeth v. Impax Labs. Inc.,
No. Civ.A. 06-222-JJF, 2006 WL 3091331, at *2 (D. Del. Oct. 26, 2006)).
242
Id. at *24
243
Id.
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thought the metadata was application metadata or file system metadata, as
defined above, clearly user-added metadata (which is more likely to be
relevant) was not at issue.
[90] The court in Kentucky Speedway rejected Williams and relied on
Wyeth, but those two decisions involved significantly different facts that
emphasize the importance of understanding the type of ESI and metadata
involved. In Williams, the issue was the production of Excel spreadsheets
in electronic formats, including metadata. The court said that generally,
“the more interactive the application, the more important the metadata is
to understanding the application's output. At one end of the spectrum is a
word processing application where the metadata is usually not critical to
understanding the substance of the document.”244 In contrast, the court
concluded that the tables of a database would have “little meaning”
without the metadata.245 With respect to Excel spreadsheets, the court
said, “[w]hile metadata is not as crucial to understanding a spreadsheet as
it is to a database application, a spreadsheet's metadata may be necessary
to understand the spreadsheet because the cells containing formulas, which
arguably are metadata themselves, often display a value rather than the
formula itself.”246 In short, the type of ESI and metadata involved seemed
crucial to the court’s decision in Williams.
[91] Just as Williams does not stand for the proposition that a party must
always produce metadata, Wyeth does not stand for the proposition that a
party never has to produce metadata. Wyeth, decided before the effective
date of the ESI Rules, involved the defendant’s request for all documents
the plaintiffs had produced in previous patent litigation against another
defendant.247 Referencing Williams, the court in Wyeth noted, “[m]ost
metadata is of limited evidentiary value, and reviewing it can waste
litigation resources.”248 The court recognized that if there were a showing

244

Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 647.
Id.
246
Id.
247
Wyeth v. Impax Labs. Inc., No. Civ.A. 06-222-JJF, 2006 WL 3091331 (D. Del. Oct.
26, 2006).
248
Id. at *2.
245
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of particularized need, however, the court could order the production of
metadata.249
[92] In Michigan First Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc’y, Inc., the court
rejected the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions for the defendant’s failure to
produce metadata for Lotus Notes e-mail messages, metadata involved the
date and time of creation of the messages, “as well as a long string of
characters that serves as a unique identifier for each message.”250 The
defendant contended that the identifier would have no evidentiary value,
and that the date and time of the creation of the message already appeared
in the PDF copy produced. The court agreed, but added, “[w]ere this not
the case, there would be value in producing the metadata.”251 In other
words, it was the type of metadata and the availability of the same
information in other form that caused the court to reject sanctions for the
failure to produce metadata.252
[93] The use of metadata to search ESI arose as issues in a number of
cases in 2007. In Scotts Co. LLC v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., the
plaintiff asked that the defendant produce ESI, including metadata, in
electronic form, instead of the hard copy form in which the defendant had
produced the documents.253 The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument
that as a matter of law, a party’s discovery obligations are not satisfied by
the production of computerized information in hard copy format.254
However, the court quoted the Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 34 that
if a “responding party ordinarily maintains the information it is producing
249

Id. For other court decisions ordering the production of metadata before the ESI
Rules went into effect, see Rodriguez v. Fresno, No. 1:05cv1017 OWW DLB, 2006 WL
903675 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2006); Hagenbuch v. 3B6 Eletronici Industriali, No. 04 C
3109, 2006 WL 665005 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2006); Nova Measuring Instruments, Ltd. v.
Nanometrics, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2006); CP Solutions PTE, Ltd. v.
Gen. Elec. Co., No. 3:04cv2150(JBA)(WIG), 2006 WL 1272615 (D. Conn. Feb. 6,
2006); In re Priceline.com Inc. Secs. Litig., 223 F.R.D. 88 (D. Conn. 2005).
250
Michigan First Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc’y, Inc., No. 05-74423, 2007 WL
4098213, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 16, 2007).
251
Id.
252
The court also concluded, without explanation, that “the production of this metadata
would be overly burdensome with no corresponding evidentiary value.” Id. at *3.
253
Scotts Co. LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:06-CV-899, 2007 WL 1723509 (S.D.
Ohio June 12, 2007).
254
Id. at *4.
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in a way that makes it searchable by electronic means, the information
should not be produced in a form that removes or significantly degrades
this feature.”255 The plaintiff argued that the documents were not
reasonably usable, because they were not searchable.256 Since it was not
clear that the parties had exhausted efforts to resolve the dispute, the court
ordered the parties to confer and report back to the court.257
[94] In In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Discount, the
plaintiffs had “rather laboriously stripped their text-searchable electronic
documents of metadata that would not appear in printed form, and then
converted them back into text searchable electronic documents without
that subset of metadata.” 258 The court compelled the defendants, in the
future, to produce the ESI, including metadata, in native format.259 The
court said, as to prospective production, that the defendants “have run
afoul of the Advisory Committee’s proviso that data ordinarily kept in
electronically searchable form ‘should not be produced in a form that
removes or significantly degrades this feature.’”260
[95] In John B. v. Goetz, the court ordered the defendants to provide
complete responses to the discovery requests of the plaintiffs, and that
these responses “shall include all metadata.”261 The court said that:
[G]iven the need for hash coding of the ESI, Brent
Antony’s limited formal computer training and the
Defendants’ position about possible alteration of ESI, the
255

Id.
The court specifically said the plaintiff argued that “some of the documents produced
in hard copy form are not reasonably usable for the purpose for which they were
requested since they cannot be searched for metadata.” Id.
257
Id.
258
In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Discount, No. MD 05-1720(JG)(JO),
2007 WL 121426, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2007). It is not clear from the decision the
content of the stripped metadata, so it is difficult to evaluate this decision.
259
Because “the Individual Plaintiffs provided a significant amount of discovery to the
defendants, in several instalments, [sic] in the form they prefer, and heard no objection
for several months,” the court did not grant the motion to compel the defendants to
reproduce the documents/ESI they had already produced. Id. at *4.
260
Id.
261
John B. v. Goetz, No. 3:98-0168, 2007 WL 3012808, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 10,
2007).
256
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Plaintiff’s expert Thomas Tigh or his designee shall be
present for the Defendants’ ESI production and provide
such other services to the Defendants as are necessary to
produce the metadata, as ordered by the Court.262
Since this decision was based on a prior consent degree, however, it is not
clear whether this decision should have any weight when there is no
agreement between the parties or a final disposition of the case.
B. RAM AND OTHER EPHEMERAL DATA
[96] Rule 34(a) allows a party to obtain discovery of “electronically
stored information – including writings, drawings, graphs, charts,
photographs, sound recording, images, and other data or data compilations
stored in any medium from which information can be obtained….”263 The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not define ESI. The Committee notes
state that the addition of “electronically stored information” to Rule 34
“clarifies that Rule 34 applies to information that is fixed in a tangible
form and to information that is stored in a medium from which it can be
retrieved and examined.”264 In other words, ESI refers to information that
a party can obtain from any storage medium and then examine – storage is
distinct from obtaining/retrieving/examining the information.
[97] In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, the court held that “data stored
in RAM, however temporarily, is electronically stored information subject
to discovery under the circumstances of the instant case,” and denied the
objection of the responding party to the earlier report and recommendation

262

Id. The Computer Dictionary Online defines “hash coding” in part as:
A scheme for providing rapid access to data items which are
distinguished by some key. Each data item to be stored is associated
with a key, e.g. the name of a person. A hash function is applied to the
item’s key and the resulting hash value is used as an index to select one
of a number of “hash buckets” in a hash table. The table contains
pointers to the original items.
Computer-Dictionary-Online.org, Hash Coding, http://www.computer-dictionaryonline.org/?q=hash%20coding (last visited Feb. 1, 2008).
263
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (emphasis added).
264
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s note (emphasis added).
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of the Magistrate Judge ordering the production of RAM.265 The plaintiffs
had filed a complaint against the defendants for knowingly enabling,
encouraging, inducing, and profiting from massive online piracy of the
plaintiffs’ copyrighted works (movies and television programs) through
the operation of their website.266 The defendants’ website offered users
files for downloading that contained code enabling computers to access
and copy copyrighted content without the permission of the copyright
holder.267 In order to prove the defendants liable for contributory
infringement, the plaintiffs had to prove that someone who the defendant
had assisted directly infringed a copyrighted work in question.268 The
plaintiffs sought Server Log Data that would show what files users were
requesting, and the plaintiffs believed would establish that users were
directly infringing the copyrighted files.269
[98] The court said that it was “undisputed that the Server Log Data
Plaintiffs seek can be copied from RAM in Defendants’ computers and
produced to Plaintiffs.”270 Although the defendants’ software had the
capability of recording Server Log Data, the defendants had not turned on
that function. The court ordered the production of that Server Log Data
under Rule 34.271
265

Columbia Pictures Inc. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443, 446 (C.D. Cal. 2007). On
December 13, 2007, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for terminating sanctions for
willful/bad faith spoliation of evidence. Id.
266
Id. at 445.
267
Id.
268
Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093 FMC(JCx), 2007 WL 4916963,
at *19 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2007).
269
Id. at *18.
270
Columbia Pictures, 245 F.R.D. at 447.
271
Id. at 448. Since the defendant in Columbia Pictures had the software that, in the
court’s mind, could easily record the data in question, the court concluded that producing
the information in the future would not be a burden. Therefore, the proportionality test of
Rule 26(b)(2)(C) did not prevent production. The court noted that its order:
[S]imply requires that the defendants in this case, as part of this
litigation, after the issuance of a court order, and following a careful
evaluation of the burden to these defendants are preserving and
producing the specific information requested in light of its relevance
and the lack of other available means to obtain it, begin preserving and
subsequently produce a particular subset of the data in RAM under
defendant’s control.
Id. at 448. Interestingly, plaintiff had not submitted an interrogatory asking for the same
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[99] The court in Columbia Pictures relied, in large part, in making its
decision that RAM was not too ephemeral to satisfy Rule 34 storage
requirement, on the Ninth Circuit’s decision of MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc.272 In MAI, the Ninth Circuit held copying of another
party’s software onto RAM was sufficient to meet the statutory
requirement for copyright infringement that the copy must be “fixed in a
tangible medium of expression … sufficiently permanent or stable to
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a
period of more than transitory duration.”273
[100] The purpose of copyright law, however, is to give individuals the
financial incentive to create literary and other works by giving those
creators limited monopolies in the form of copyrights.274 The broader the
definition of “copy,” the greater the financial incentive copyright law
provides for the creation of the original works. In other words, with a
broad definition of copy, the author would have greater control over future
production of similar works by third parties. That aspect of copyright law
supports a broad definition of what constitutes a copy of a work. In
contrast, under Rule 1, the inexpensive and speedy administration of
justice, not the celebration of the profit motive, are the purposes of the
Federal Rules.275
[101] The issue in MAI was whether a copy had been fixed.276 In
Columbia Pictures, the issue should have been whether the information
was “stored” (in “electronically stored information”).277 On that point, the
common understanding of “to fix” is “to make firm or stable,”278 whereas
the common understanding “to store” is “to stock or furnish against future
time.”279 Since fix and store mean different things, and the purpose of
information requested in the Request for Production of Documents. It is not clear what
objections the defendant could have made if the request had been in the form of an
interrogatory.
272
Id. at 447.
273
MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computers, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing 17
U.S.C. § 101).
274
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
275
FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
276
MAI, 991 F.2d at 517.
277
Columbia Pictures Inc. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443, 446 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
278
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 440 (10th ed. 1999).
279
Id. at 1159.
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copyright law is different than the purpose of discovery in civil cases, the
result in MAI should not have directed the result in Columbia Pictures.
[102] The court in Columbia Pictures made clear that it was not saying
the defendant had violated any duty to preserve documents before the
issuance of the order.280 However, if the court had the authority to order
production of the information on RAM because the RAM constituted ESI,
it could logically follow that the defendants have a duty to preserve that
information to the extent it is relevant, at least from the time the litigation
starts:
When a “forensic image” is taken of a computer, that image
only records data (bits) on the hard drive of the computer,
not data on RAM. In order to capture data on RAM,
typically one “(1) saves the data to a hard drive or CD
ROM, or (2) installs a ‘data dump program,’ which
downloads the data on RAM at any particular time through
the hard drive of the computer. 281
In other words, a strong argument can be made that data is not retrieved
and examined from RAM, but is retrieved and examined from hard drives
and CD ROM’s.
[103] Although not directly on point, the reasoning of a 2005 Florida state
court decision on RAM seems to contain better reasoning than the
reasoning in Columbia Pictures. In O’Brien v. O’Brien, an appeal of a
divorce decision, the court addressed the use at trial of communications
intercepted by the wife from the husband’s computer. 282 The wife had
installed, without the knowledge of the husband, a spyware program on
the husband’s computer that copied and stored electronic communications

280

Columbia Pictures, 245 F.R.D. at 448
Douglas L. Rogers, Columbia Pictures v. Bunnell, 4-11 MEASLEY’S LITIG. REP. DISC.
20 (2007). See also CSO Security Counsel, Cybercrime,
http://www.csoonline.com/counsel/session9/question806.html (last visited Feb. 11,
2008); X-Ways Software Technology AG, X-Ways Capture: Successfully Seize All Hard
Disks, Files, and RAM, http://www.winhex.com/capture/index-m.html (last visited Feb.
11, 2008).
282
O’Brien v. O’Brien, 899 So.2d 1133 (Fla. App. 2005).
281
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between the husband and another woman.283 That spyware program took
snapshots of what appeared on the computer screen, allowing it to capture
and record chat conversations, instant messages, and e-mails.284 The
husband learned of the software, removed the software, and obtained a
permanent injunction to prevent the wife’s disclosure of the intercepted
communications in violation of the Florida equivalent of the Federal
Wiretap Act.285 The wife appealed and argued that the communications
were retrieved from storage, and therefore, were not intercepted
communications in violation of the Florida Act.286
[104] The court in O’Brien rejected the wife’s argument that the
communications were, in fact, stored once the text image became visible
on the screen.287 The court reasoned:
We do not believe that this evanescent time period is
sufficient to transform acquisition of the communication
from a contemporaneous interception to retrieval from
electronic storage. We conclude that because the spyware
installed by the Wife intercepted the electronic
communication contemporaneously with transmission,
copied it, and routed the copy to a file on the computer’s
hard drive, the electronic communications were intercepted
in violation of the Florida Act.288
[105] In other words, the Florida court concluded that simply because
information was displayed on a computer screen, and thus was on RAM,
did not mean it was stored information. Although O’Brien involved the
Florida equivalent of the Wiretap Act, and not Rule 34, O’Brien draws a
reasonable distinction between information on RAM and information
stored on non-volatile memory.
[106] Before the ESI Rules, one federal court refused to order the
production of similar ephemeral information. In Convolve Inc. v.
283

Id. at 1134.
Id.
285
Id.
286
Id.
287
Id. at 1137
288
Id.
284
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Compaq Computer Corp., Convolve sued Compaq for patent infringement
and trade secret misappropriation, and asked for sanctions for failing to
print data displayed temporarily on the computer screen involving tests of
an oscilloscope. 289 The court said that “the data at issue here are
ephemeral. They exist only until the tuning engineer makes the next
adjustment, and then the document changes. No business purpose ever
dictated that they be retained, even briefly.”290 Therefore, “absent the
violation of a preservation order,” the court concluded that no sanctions
were warranted.291
[107] Similarly, in a 2007 decision, Phillips v. Netblue, Inc., the
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to
preserve the images that would have been obtained by clicking on the
hyperlinks in the e-mails retained by the plaintiff. 292 The court rejected
the argument that the “plaintiff had the obligation to memorialize the emails as they would have appeared if opened in an e-mail program soon
after their receipt, i.e. with the images which the e-mail program would
have displayed upon automatically accessing the remote web-server where
those images resided.”293 The court concluded that this was not a failure to
preserve evidence, but a failure to gather evidence, and the “law opposes
289

Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computers Corp., 223 F.R.D. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
Id. at 177.
291
Id. See also Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 427 F3d 727 (10th Cir. 2005). Procter
& Gable sued the defendants for trademark infringement. The district court dismissed the
claims of Proctor & Gamble for failing to comply with discovery orders, in particular
market share computer data that the plaintiff had viewed on line but did not own or
possess. The Tenth Circuit said that:
[T]he record indicates that the data was compiled, possessed, and
owned by IRI, which in turn provided P&G with access to that data for
a fee. Although the IRI data in general could be deemed to have fallen
within certain of defendants’ broadly-worded discovery requests, it is
unclear precisely how P&G was to produce that data to defendants.
Id. at 739. The court focused on a number of different ways Proctor & Gamble might
have obtained that information and whether those ways would have been burdensome.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court, but did not conclude that the data was not
ESI. Instead, it concluded that “the district court offered no explanation of what it meant
by ‘relevant electronic data’ and what steps it believed P&G could and should have taken
to preserve such data.” Id. at 739-40.
292
Phillips v. Netblue, Inc., No. C-05-441 SC, 2007 WL 174459 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22,
2007).
293
Id. at *2.
290
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no obligation upon a party to gather evidence other than the requirement
that a party have sufficient evidence to support their claim.”294
C. PRINCIPLES
[108] A party considering a request from opposing counsel to produce
metadata needs to ask at least five questions.295 First, what type of
metadata is the other party actually requesting, and has that party provided
an explanation of the reason for the request? Second, is the metadata
relevant to claims or defenses in the case, including authentication of any
documents/other ESI? Third, even if the metadata is not relevant, does the
requesting party have a good argument that the metadata will help it
search the relevant ESI? Fourth, if there is user-created metadata,296 how
will any privileged material be redacted, identified, and preserved in case
there is a subsequent challenge to the redaction? Fifth, if the party
produces metadata existing on a particular date, does it have to supplement
that production later under Rule 26(e) as the metadata changes? The
answers to such questions will determine the response to the request,
including any objections.
[109] A party considering a request to produce a database should ask
similar questions to a request for metadata.
For instance, what
information in the database is really relevant to the claims or defenses in
the case? If only parts of the database contain relevant non-privileged
material, how can the relevant material be produced while sufficiently
maintaining the usability of the database in order for the producing party
to comply with Rule 34? If the information in the database changes over
time, is there a need to supplement?
294
295

Id. at *3.
See, e.g., Sedona Principles, supra note 13, at Guideline 12, Comment 12.c.
To the extent that the parties believe that production of metadata is
needed because of either relevance or usability, that should be raised at
this conference as it will be a consideration in determining both the
need to preserve information in a particular form and the ultimate form
or forms of production. . . . To the extent that the requesting party seeks
a ‘native’ production or some other form of production with
accompanying metadata, the revised rule places a burden on the party
to make that request explicit.

Id.
296

See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
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[110] The decision in Columbia Pictures that information on RAM
constitutes ESI raises a number of issues, even though the specific facts in
Columbia Pictures are not likely to occur in many future cases.297 In a
future case in the jurisdiction of the Columbia Pictures court, does a party
have to decide whether information on RAM is relevant and then tell
opposing counsel the RAM is not reasonably accessible within the
meaning of Rule 26(b)(2)(B),298 or risk waiving any objection to the
production of information on RAM? Would making such a statement
unnecessarily “flag” an issue that opposing counsel might not otherwise
raise? Although this article argues that information on RAM is not ESI
within the meaning of Rule 34, at least the Central District of California
has concluded that “data stored in RAM, however temporarily, is
electronically stored information . . . ,” so failing to make an early
statement concerning not searching RAM could be risky.299
[111] One should not attempt to answer these questions in the abstract,
however, but should address these questions as quickly as possible in the
context of an actual dispute. A party should probably approach opposing
counsel and, if necessary, the court, to resolve disputes on these questions
instead of having to fight a motion for sanctions months later. Indeed, this
suggested approach simply follows the requirement of Rule 26(f) that “the
parties must confer, as soon as practicable . . . [to] discuss any issues about
preserving discoverable information [] and develop a proposed discovery
plan . . . [concerning] any issues about disclosure or discovery of
electronically stored information, including the form or forms in which it
should be produced.”300

297

Rarely will server log data be as relevant as it was in Columbia Pictures. Also,
because the server had the software to record each request received for a file, except for
volume, there would be no difficulty in turning on the server log function and recording
each request, rather than trying to develop a program to perform the desired function.
298
See discussion infra Part V.
299
Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443, 446 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
300
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).

66

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIV, Issue 3

V. GOOD CAUSE FOR PRODUCTION OF NOT REASONABLY
ACCESSIBLE ESI
A.

INTRODUCTION

[112] The ESI Rules create a two-tier system of discovery.301 The
presumption is that a party must produce relevant accessible ESI, but does
not have to produce inaccessible ESI.302
[113] Under Rule 26(b)(2)(B), a party initially does not have to produce
ESI containing relevant information that it “identifies as not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost.”303 After all, in contrast to
searching accessible sources, searching for deleted documents in the
unallocated space304 of a hard drive, or in the slack space305 of a hard
301

Theodore C. Hirt, The Two-Tier Discovery Provision of Rule 26(b)(2)(B) - A
Reasonable Measure for Controlling Electronic Discovery, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 12
(2007); Rosenthal, supra note 1; Withers, supra note 9, at *82-90.
302
This presumption about the production of relevant, accessible ESI is of course subject
to the proportionality provisions of Rule 26(b)(2)(C). See supra Part III.
303
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). Only inaccessible ESI not being searched that contains
potentially responsive information needs to be identified; a party does not have to
identify all inaccessible ESI not being searched. In addition to producing relevant,
accessible ESI that is not privileged, “[t]he responding party must also identify, by
category or type, the sources containing potentially responsive information that it is
neither searching nor producing.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 234 F.R.D. 219, Committee Note
(b)(2) (2006). See also infra text accompanying note 307, at Guideline 2, Comment 2.c.
(“Importantly, the Rules do not require the identification of all inaccessible sources of
electronically stored information, but only those that the producing party believes in good
faith may contain relevant, non-duplicative information.”).
304
Unallocated space is usually the result of a file being deleted. When a file is
deleted, it is not actually erased, but is simply no longer accessible
through normal means [the directory or index of folders for the hard
drive]. The space that it occupied becomes unallocated space. . . . Until
portions of the unallocated space are used for new data storage, in most
instances, the old data remains and can be retrieved using forensic
techniques.
Sedona Glossary, supra note 110, at 52.
305
The unused space on a cluster that exists when the logical file space is less than
the physical file space. . . . A form of residual data, the amount of ondisc file space from the end of the logical record information to the end
of the physical disc record. Slack space can contain information softdeleted from the record, information from prior records stored at the
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drive, by itself, can be very time consuming and expensive. If the other
party files a motion to compel, then the resisting party has the burden of
showing that the “information is not reasonably accessible because of
undue burden or costs.”306 If the resisting party shows the information is
not reasonably accessible, production may still be ordered if the requesting
party shows “good cause,” considering the proportionality provisions in
26(b)(2)(C).307 If the court finds good cause for production, it can still
impose conditions on the production, including shifting costs for accessing
and converting the ESI to a useable format.308
[114] There is no good cause for the production of inaccessible ESI if: (i)
the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative; (ii) the
party seeking discovery has ample opportunity by discovery to obtain the
information sought; or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit.309 The Committee Notes state:
Appropriate considerations may include: (1) the specificity
of the discovery request; (2) the quantity of information
available from other and more easily accessed sources; (3)
the failure to produce relevant information that seems likely
to have existed but is no longer available on more easily
accessed sources; (4) the likelihood of finding relevant,
responsive information that cannot be obtained from other,
more easily accessed sources; (5) predictions as to the
importance and usefulness of the further information; (6)

same physical location as current records, metadata fragments, and
other information useful for forensic analysis of computer systems.
Id. at 48.
306
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
307
FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 234 F.R.D. 219, Amendments and Committee Note (2006).
308
Id. For an early discussion of cost-shifting with respect to discovery of ESI, see
Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and The Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561
(2001). In that article, Redish noted, “[b]ecause litigants do not bear the costs created by
their discovery requests their incentive to confine those requests in a procedurally
efficient manner is significantly distorted.” Id. at 569.
309
For the complete text of the proportionality provisions of Rule 26(b)(2)(C), see text
accompanying supra note 146.
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the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and
(7) the parties’ resources.310
[115] The requesting party has the burden, in light of all of these factors,
“of showing that its need for the discovery outweighs the burdens and
costs of locating, retrieving and producing the information.”311 In other
words, before finding good cause for the production of inaccessible
information, a court must consider the seven factors, including the time it
takes the producing party to review the ESI for responsiveness and
privilege, and not simply the cost of collecting the ESI. The possibility of
shifting the cost of restoring ESI to an accessible format does not resolve
the issue.312
[116] With this information as background, the next section examines
how the courts in fact have responded under the ESI Rules to requests for
the discovery of ESI in inaccessible format, or if in accessible format,
information not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.313

310

See Committee Notes, supra note 7 (emphasis added). These seven factors are an
extension of the three proportionality factors.
311
See id.
312
The Committee Notes state, “A requesting party’s willingness to share or bear the
access costs may be weighed by the court in determining whether there is good cause.
But the producing party’s burden in reviewing the information for relevance and privilege
may weigh against permitting the requested discovery.” Id. Comment 13b to Sedona
Principle 13 states:
Shifting the costs of extraordinary electronically stored information
discovery efforts should not be used as an alternative to sustaining a
responding party’s objection to undertaking such efforts in the first
place. Instead, such efforts should only be required where the
requesting party demonstrates substantial need or justification. The
courts should discourage burdensome requests that have no reasonable
prospect, given the size of the case, of significantly contributing to the
discovery effort, even if the requesting party is wiling to pay.
The Sedona Principles, supra note 13, at 68, Principle 13.
313
Since December 1, 2006, some courts have responded without expressly referring to
26(b)(2)(B).
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B. CASES DECIDED ON PRODUCTION OF INACCESSIBLE ESI
1. GOOD CAUSE
A.

PRODUCTION DISCREPANCIES

[117] In a decision issued a few days before the effective date of the new
ESI rules, the district court ordered the imaging of hard drives.314
Although the court had previously rejected defendant’s motion, this time
the court granted the motion, in part because:
[S]erious questions exist both as to the reliability and the
completeness of materials produced in discovery by
Advante. Among other things, there is evidence that copies
of e-mails were altered at some point in time in a matter
that arguably served to downplay or even conceal a
relationship between Advante and James Liu, and the
extent to which Liu may have worked with Advante to
develop the products at issue in this action.315
[118] The court also granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel the imaging
of the hard drive of the defendants in Ameriwood Industries, Inc. v.
Liberman, but said that “a party may not inspect the physical hard drives
314

Advante Int’l. Corp. v. Mintel Learning Techs., No. C 05-01022 JW (RS), 2006 WL
3371576 (N.D. Calif. Nov. 21, 2006). Advante involved trade secret litigation. Id. at *2.
The court ordered the parties to report back by December 1, 2006 on a protocol for the
examination of the hard drive, and presumably the court was applying the ESI Rules.
315
Id. at *1. The court rejected the argument of the defendant that production of the emails in native format should be sufficient, concluding that “sufficient questions exist,
not only with respect to these emails but also with respect to other discrepancies in
Advante’s discovery responses, such that a forensic examination of Advante’s hard drives
is warranted.” Id. The court ordered counsel for the parties to meet and confer on a
protocol for the imaging and production of responsive documents, and added that
“whatever documents or data may be recovered in the inspection, whether existing
documents, recovered deleted documents, or other information, should all be produced
first to counsel for Advante for its review as to relevance, responsiveness, and privilege,
prior to any disclosure to Mintel or its counsel.” Id. (citing Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v.
Wells, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1054-55 (S.D. Calif. 1999)). In Playboy, referring to then
Rule 26(b)(2), the court said, “The only restriction in this discovery is that the producing
party be protected against undue burden and expense and/or invasion of privileged
matters.” Playboy, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 1053.
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of a computer merely because the party wants to search for additional
documents responsive to the party’s document requests.”316 The court
added that “discrepancies or inconsistencies in the responding party’s
discovery responses may justify a party’s request to allow an expert to
create and examine a mirror image of the hard drive.”317 However, the
specific good cause the court found for ordering the imaging of the hard
drive of the defendants was that the plaintiff provided to the court a
relevant e-mail sent by the defendant to a third party that the defendant
had not produced. The court concluded that other deleted or active
versions of e-mails might exist on the defendant’s computers, so the court
ordered the search.318 The plaintiff did “not object to incurring … the
costs involved in creating the mirror images, recovering the information,
and translating the information into searchable formats,” so the court said
plaintiff would incur those costs.319 However, the court did not indicate
whether the defendant had objected to the time it would take to review the
restored material for responsiveness and privilege. In fact, restoring ESI
to an accessible format can cost less than the cost of reviewing that
restored ESI for responsiveness and privilege.
[119] In Disability Rights Council of Greater Washington v. Washington
Metro. Transit Auth., the court ordered the defendants to search backup
tapes as a result of their failure to turn off automatic delete procedures in
their computer system. 320 The court noted that “the request is for the emails of specific persons, and there is absolutely no other source from
316

Ameriwood Indus. Inc. v. Liberman, No. 4:06CV524-DJS, 2006 WL 3825291 at *4
(E.D. Mo. Dec. 27, 2006) (citing McCurdy Group v. Am. Biomedical Group, Inc., 9 Fed.
Appx. 822, 831 (10th Cir. 2001)).
317
Id. at *4 (citing Simon Property Group LP v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 641
(S.D. Ind. 2000)) (emphasis added).
318
Id. at *3. The court also suggested a type of case in which there may be good cause
for searching a hard drive: “cases where defendant allegedly used the computer itself to
commit the wrong that is the subject of the lawsuit. …” Id. at *4. The Court then set
forth a procedure for imaging the hard drive, which included the plaintiffs selecting an
expert of its choice to go to the defendants’ places of business and take forensic images.
No employee of the plaintiff, or its counsel, would inspect or otherwise handle the
equipment or information produced. The expert would then provide the recovered
documents to the defendants’ counsel, with a notice to the plaintiff. See id. at *5 and *6.
319
Id. at *5.
320
Disability Rights Council of Greater Washington v. Washington Metro. Transit Auth.,
242 F.R.D. 139, 148 (D.D.C. 2007).
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which electronically stored information can be secured, thanks to
WMATA’s failure to impose the litigation hold.”321 Moreover, “WMATA
[did] not defend its failure to prevent the automatic feature from operating
during the course of this litigation,” when it had an obligation to preserve
documents.322
[120] The court ordered the defendants to restore at their cost a portion of
their inaccessible backup tapes in AAB Joint Ventures v. United States,
which was a dispute over construction contracts.323
The plaintiffs
asserted that the defendant had identified numerous individuals who were
participants in the project, but did not produce their e-mail. The court
noted that the defendant countered that it had produced thousands of
electronic documents, but had conceded it was unable to locate e-mails of
some of the individuals who presumably generated e-mails within the
scope of the documents requested by the plaintiff. The court said it could
not “relieve defendant of its duty to produce those documents merely
because defendant had chosen a means to preserve the evidence [referring
to backup tapes] which makes ultimate production of relevant documents
expensive.”324
B.

OTHER REASONS

[121] Medical claims files in electronic, but essentially unsearchable,
format were the documents the court ordered the defendant to produce in
W.E. Aubuchon Co., Inc. v. Benefirst, LLC.325 Once they were processed
for payment, the requested claims forms were retained for a 60 day period.
Batches of these claims forms were scanned and stored as electronic
321

Id. The court also said that the plaintiffs had no substantial resources and that the law
firm representing them was proceeding pro bono, and noted that the fact “persons who
suffer from physical disabilities have equal transportation resources to work and to enjoy
their lives with their fellow citizens is a crucial concern of this community.” Id.
322
Id. at *146.
323
AAB Joint Ventures v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 432 (2007). Without expressly
discussing Rule 26(b)(2), the court said that from the results of that sample, the court
would determine whether additional restoration of backup tapes would likely lead to the
production of relevant evidence. Id. at *443-44.
324
Id. at *440. Similarly, the court later said that “defendant’s decision to transfer the emails to backup tapes does not exempt defendant from its responsibility to produce
relevant emails.” Id. at *443.
325
W.E. Aubuchon Co., Inc. v. Benefirst, LLC, 245 F.R.D. 38 (D. Mass. 2007).
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images (in groups according to when they were processed and the person
who processed the claims). The original forms were then destroyed.
[122] The issues the judge considered in his February 6, 2007 decision in
Aubuchon were whether the information was reasonably accessible, and if
it was not, should it be produced. The court agreed that a media-based
approach to considering accessibility was reasonable and concluded that
since the images were stored on a server, they were in an accessible
format. However, the court continued that to in fact be accessible, the ESI
must be readily usable once it is obtained, whereas inaccessible data has to
be “restored or otherwise manipulated to be usable,” citing Zubulake.326
Since the information was stored in images, and only indexed in load files
by processing date and the person who processed the claim, the court
concluded that “the retrieval of the records will be costly and…. such
retrieval would involve undue burden or cost.”327 In other words, even
though the ESI was in an accessible format, the court concluded the ESI
was not reasonably accessible due to undue burden or cost.
[123] The court in Aubuchon then turned to the issue of good cause for
production and considered the seven points discussed in the Committee
Notes.328 It noted that the digital images were not available through any
other source, and that the information was crucial to the outcome of the
litigation. There was no discussion of when the duty to preserve attached,
perhaps because of the statement that “although in the custody and control
of Benefirst, the records at issue are the property of the plaintiffs.”329 The
court also relied on the fact that the plaintiffs had significantly narrowed
their original request from approximately 34,000 claims to 3,000 claims,
and ordered the defendant to produce the approximately 3,000 claims at
the defendant’s expense.330
[124] The court granted the plaintiff’s motion to have a digital image
made of the hard drives in Cenveo Corp. v. Slater, a case alleging that the
defendants improperly used confidential information and trade secrets to
326

Id. at 42.
Id. at 43.
328
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
329
Id. at 44.
330
Id. at 45.
327
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divert business from the plaintiff to the defendants.331 The court said the
issue:
[R]equires a weighing of defendants’ burden in producing
the information sought against plaintiff’s interest in access
to that information. Because of the close relationship
between plaintiff’s claims and defendants’ computer
equipment, the Court will allow plaintiff to select an expert
to oversee the imaging of all the defendants’ computer
equipment.332
Presumably the reference to “close relationship” referred to the fact that
the plaintiff thought the defendants’ computers contained the proprietary
information of the plaintiff. However, there was no discussion in the
decision about the basis for that belief, whether e-mails had been
previously produced, and if so, what the e-mails or other earlier
production had disclosed.
[125] The court ordered the forensic examination of the hard drive of the
plaintiff’s computer in Thielend v. Juan Boungiorno USA, Inc.,333 in which
the plaintiff had sued the defendant for sending text messages to plaintiff’s
cell phone without the plaintiff’s permission. The court said:
Unlike the not so distant past, when individual file folders
pertaining to specific subjects could be readily identified
and removed from a file drawer for inspection without
disclosing the rest of the contents of the file cabinet to the
opposing side, inspection of an opponent’s computer may
open up countless files to the searcher that are not relevant
and that may be proprietary or privileged.334
The court concluded that the defendant had established “a viable reason”
for the discovery, in particular whether the plaintiff had used his computer
331

Cenveo Corp. v. Slater, No. 06-CV-2623, 2007 WL 442387 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2007).
Id. at *2.
333
Thielend v. Juan Boungiorno USA, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-16, 2007 WL 465680 (W.D.
Mich. Feb. 8, 2007).
334
Id. at *2.
332
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to initiate contact with the defendant, an issue relevant to whether the
plaintiff had received unsolicited communications from the defendant.335
[126] The court in Thieland, however, said that to allow the defendant
unrestricted access to the plaintiff’s computer would constitute an undue
burden, not due to cost, but due to the defendant’s access to proprietary
and privileged information of the plaintiff.336 The court ordered the
defendant, through an expert, to conduct the forensic examination of the
plaintiff’s computer and to limit its examination of the forensic image to
determining whether from December 1 through December 15 of 2005, the
plaintiff accessed the defendant’s website, and what, if any, information
about those transactions had been deleted.337
[127] In In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Securities Litigation,338 a
shareholders’ derivative action against the board of directors for breach of
fiduciary duty,339 the court concluded that plaintiff had demonstrated good
cause to order defendants to restore backup tapes pursuant to Rule
26(b)(2)(C). The court explained:
[E]-mails sent or received by defendants relating to the
issues herein could constitute important relevant evidence
and are reasonably calculated to lead to admissible
evidence.
It has not been demonstrated that said
information is reasonably available from any other easily

335

Id.
“Cost to plaintiff is not a factor. It appears there would be little out-of-pocket expense
to plaintiff if the defendant was to take an image of the hard drive of his computer.” Id.
at *2, n. 3.
337
Id. at *3. The defendant was ordered to select an experienced forensic examiner to
conduct the investigation and to conduct the investigation outside of the presence of the
parties or their attorneys. The expert was to provide a hard copy of the proposed findings
to the plaintiff’s counsel for review prior to furnishing them to the defendant’s counsel.
Id.
338
In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 05 MD 1695(CM)(GAY),
2007 WL 983987 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2007).
339
See In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Securities Litigation, 434 F. Supp. 2d 267 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
336
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accessed source. The discovery requests are specific. The
resources of the parties are not an issue.340
There was no explanation in the decision of why the court concluded
resources were not an issue, no discussion of when the duty to preserve
documents attached, and no discussion of why the court appeared to put
the burden on the objecting party to prove that the requested information
was reasonably available from accessible sources.
2. NO GOOD CAUSE
[128] In Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Topeka the court rejected the
plaintiff’s motion to compel restoration and searching of the defendant’s
backup tapes.341 The litigation involved the City of Topeka’s decision to
deny a request for conditional use permits. Defendant Topeka had
deleted, in June of 2005, the electronic communications that formed the
basis of the discovery dispute, but the defendant received notice of the
likelihood of litigation on August 12, 2005. The court said that “there is
no evidence on the record to indicate that at the time of the receipt of the
demand letter the backup tapes on the server system contained allegedly
deleted e-mails from June, 2005.”342 The court added that even if such
backup tapes had been shown to possess deleted e-mail communications,
litigation holds generally did not apply to inaccessible backup tapes, and
such tapes could “continue to be recycled on the schedule set forth in the
company’s policy.”343
[129] The court in Oxford House then considered whether searching the
backup tapes would be unduly burdensome. The court said that the mere
fact that compliance would cause great labor and expense or considerable

340

In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 05 MD 1695(CM)(GAY),
2007 WL 983987 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2007). The court declined to rule on any cost
shifting until the defendant had produced electronic discovery at its own expense and
then submitted an affidavit detailing the results of its search and the time and money
spent.
341
Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Topeka, No. 06-4004-RDR, 2007 WL 1246200 (D. Kan.
Apr. 27, 2007).
342
Id. at *3.
343
Id. at *4 (Quoting Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 217).
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hardship did not, in itself, require denial of the motion.344 Instead, there
should be a cost-benefit analysis investigating the marginal utility of
additional production versus the cost.345 The court denied the motion to
compel because “the likelihood of retrieving these electronic
communications is low and the cost high.”346
[130] Also, in Ameriwood Industries, Inc. v. Liberman,347 the court did
not find good cause to order the production of e-mails and Microsoft
Office files. Ameriwood claimed that the defendants, former employees
of Ameriwood, had formed a company and improperly used confidential
information taken from Ameriwood. The defendants moved to compel the
production of ESI that included 52,124 potentially responsive e-mails and
4,413 additional computer files, such as Microsoft Office files. The court
held that “the information is not reasonably accessible because the request
is unduly burdensome, and turns to defendants for a showing of good
cause.”348 In other words, although in an accessible format, the court
found that the e-mails were not reasonably accessible due to undue
burden, presumably not because collecting the e-mails and Microsoft files
would be burdensome, but because reviewing them for responsiveness and
privilege would have taken a lot of time and effort by attorneys.
[131] The court in this Ameriwood decision considered the question of
good cause and the factors identified by the Committee Notes. The court
concluded that the defendants’ request was not narrowly tailored to seek
only information relevant to the affirmative defense that the plaintiff’s lost
sales were due to the plaintiff’s mismanagement, and did not discuss any
of the other six factors in the Committee Notes.349 The court added that
the “defendants have failed to show good cause to order disclosure of the
344

Id. (quoting Snowden v. Cannaught Lab., Inc., 137 F.R.D. 325, 332-333 (D. Kan.
1991)).
345
Id.
346
Id. at *5
347
Ameriwood Industries, Inc. v. Liberman, No. 4:06CV524-DJS, 2007 WL 496716
(E.D. Mo. Feb. 13, 2007). This decision ruled on a motion to compel by the defendant,
whereas the earlier Ameriwood decision, No. 4:06CV524-DJS, 2006 WL 3825291 (E.D.
Mo. Dec. 27, 2006), text accompanying supra notes 316-19, involved a motion to compel
by the plaintiff.
348
Id. at *2.
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communications and documents, even if the court were to limit the request
of the documents involving the six aforementioned employees.”350
[132] In Calyon v. Mizuho Securities USA, Inc., the court tentatively
denied the plaintiff’s motion to have direct, complete access to the
defendant’s hard drives to show that the defendants had transmitted the
proprietary business information of the plaintiff through the defendant’s
computers.351 The court noted that the plaintiff had not argued that (1) the
individual defendants had failed to produce all responsive documents, (2)
there were discrepancies or inconsistencies in defendant’s responses to
previous discovery requests, or (3) relevant documents or data had been
lost.352 The court rejected the plaintiff’s motion to compel, but ordered the
defendants to preserve mirror images of the hard drives and other storage
devices at issue.353
[133] In Scotts Company LLC v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., the court
rejected the plaintiff’s request to require the defendant to allow a forensic
expert to search the defendant’s computer system, network service and
databases and to require the defendant to provide backup tapes of certain
information systems.354 The court noted that imaging of computer hard
drives was an expensive process, because “an examination of a hard drive
by an expert automatically triggers the retention of an expert by the
350

Id.
Calyon v. Mizuho Sec. USA, Inc., No. 07CIV02241RODF, 2007 WL 1468889, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2007). The plaintiff and the individual defendants reached an
agreement to preserve the hard drives of the personal computers and the computer storage
devices of the individual defendants by creating mirrored images, but the parties had not
agreed on a protocol for reviewing the mirror images. The plaintiff alleged that former
employees, the defendants, had conspired to transmit the plaintiff’s proprietary business
information to the other defendant. Id. at *1.
352
Id. at *5.
353
If, after the Individual Defendants’ production of documents and data
from those mirror images, Calyon can demonstrate that relevant and
responsive information has been withheld or is missing, or that the
Individual Defendants’ expert has failed to consult fully, in good faith,
with Calyon’s expert in order to develop an appropriate search
protocol, then Calyon may renew its application for direct access to the
mirror images.
Id. at *6.
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Scotts Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., No. 2:06-CV-899, 2007 WL 1723509, at *1, *3
(S.D. Ohio June 12, 2007).
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responding party for the same purpose.”355 The court also noted that
imaging a hard drive resulted in the production of “massive amounts of
irrelevant, and perhaps privileged information.”356 The court said it was
“loath to sanction intrusive examination of an opponent’s computer as a
matter of course, or on the mere suspicion that the opponent may be
withholding discoverable information.”357
[134] In Pipefitters Local No. 636 Pension Fund v. Mercer Human
Resources Consulting, Inc., the district court vacated the report and
recommendation of the magistrate judge that the plaintiffs would bear the
cost of restoring or locating electronic data, if the defendants requested
such data. 358 The court said, “[d]ue to the lack of a record it is not
apparent that the Magistrate Judge engaged in the proper analysis before
shifting the cost of discovery to plaintiffs.”359
C. PRINCIPLES
[135] The issue of whether there is good cause to require a party to search
for inaccessible ESI should focus on the conduct of that party, as the
courts did: (1) in ordering searches of inaccessible data in Advante,
Ameriwood (2006), Disability Rights and AAB; and (2) in rejecting a
motion to search inaccessible ESI in Calyon and Scotts. As the court held
in Disability Rights, good cause to order the search of inaccessible ESI
clearly arises when the requesting party shows that the producing party
allowed the destruction of ESI in accessible format when it had an
obligation to preserve documents.360 Under Advante, good cause to order
the search of inaccessible ESI clearly arises when there has been alteration
of documents or ESI produced. 361 Also, if a party fails to produce many
relevant e-mails that clearly existed at a time when that party had an
355
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357
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358
Pipefitters Local No. 636 Pension Fund v. Mercer Human Res. Consulting, Inc., No.
05-CV-74326, 2007 WL 2080365, at *1, *3 (E.D. Mich. July 19, 2007).
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Id. at *2.
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Disability Rights Council of Greater Washington v. Washington Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 242 F.R.D. 139, 147-48 (D.D.C. 2007).
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Advante Int’l Corp., v. Mintel Learning Tech., No. C. 05-01022 JW (RS), 2006 WL
3371576, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2006).
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obligation to preserve documents, as appeared to be the case in AAB, that
would also appear to justify an initial finding of “good cause” to search for
ESI in inaccessible format.362
[136] To conclude, however, that there is good cause because a defendant
failed to produce one e-mail it had sent to a third party, as the court
apparently did in the 2006 Ameriwood decision, seems to be a very low
standard. 363 It could be the reason the producing party did not retain the email is that the producing party had a different, and perfectly reasonable,
document retention policy than the third party receiving the e-mail. There
would not necessarily be any indication that the producing party had failed
to comply with any of its obligations, so there would not necessarily
appear to be good cause to impose the burden of searching for, and then
reviewing for responsiveness and privilege, inaccessible information.
[137] Rule 26(b)(2)(B) says the requesting party must show good cause,
“considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C).”364 Rule 26(b)(2)(B) does
not say “good cause” equals the limitations in 26(b)(2)(C) or the factors in
the Committee Notes.
[138] Failing to put primary weight on the conduct of the party who has
the ESI, or only considering (a) the three proportionality factors in
26(b)(2)(C), incorporated into 26(b)(2)(B), and (b) the related seven
factors listed in the Committee Notes, would let the tail wag the dog. If
the party with the ESI has complied with all of its obligations to preserve
documents/ESI and produce accessible ESI, then generally there should
not be good cause to order the search of inaccessible ESI. At least in the
case of the producing party having complied with all of its legal
obligations, the marginal utility of the ESI sought should be much greater
to warrant an order requiring a search of inaccessible ESI than if the party
has not complied with all its obligations.
[139] Why should there be a finding of good cause simply because the
requesting party alleges that the producing party used the computers in
362

AAB Joint Venture v. U.S., 75 Fed. Cl. 432, 440 (Fed. Cl. 2007).
Ameriwood Indus., Inc. v. Liberman, No. 4:06CV524-DJS, 2006 WL 3825291, at *1
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question to commit tortuous acts? Although the court in Cenveo found the
allegation of such conduct in the complaint good cause, the decision in
Scotts rejecting a per se rule appears more sound. 365 At a minimum, a
requesting party should have to show that it requested accessible e-mails,
and then show that what was produced as a result of that request supports
a finding of good cause.366 The burden is on the requesting party to show
good cause.
VI. CONCLUSION
[140] Parties to litigation should not be hesitant to fight for reasonable
restrictions on preservation and production. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure allow for – and the intent behind them indeed call for - more
restraints on discovery than many courts and parties recognize.
[141] On the other hand, a responding party wanting to narrow overly
broad preservation demands or discovery requests should understand that
unilateral imposition of what seems to that party to be reasonable
preservation and production decisions can significantly increase the risks
for that responding party and its attorneys, because the law is unclear in
these areas. What is clear is that the ESI Rules tie the tools for restraints
on discovery to increased disclosure between the opposing parties and
increased judicial supervision of discovery.367 Parties to litigation proceed
at their own risk if they disregard either branch of the “bargain:” (1) tools
to enforce balanced preservation/discovery and (2) greater transparency in
preservation/discovery.
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Cenveo Corp. v. Slater, No. 06-CV-2632, 2007 WL 442387, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31,
2007); Scotts Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., No. 2:06-CV-899, 2007 WL 1723509, at *2
(S.D. Ohio June 12, 2007).
366
More easily accessed sources—whether computer-based, paper, or
human – may yield all the information that is reasonably useful for the
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two-tier practice in which they first sort through the information that
can be provided from easily accessed sources and then determine
whether it is necessary to search the difficult-to-access sources.
Court Rules, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 234 F.R.D. 219, 331 (2006).
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